Last updated: September 29, 2026 at 8:42 AM UTC
All 891 Vulnerability 357 Breach 144 Threat 383 Defense 7

Anthropic Mythos Preview AI finds 10,000+ high-severity flaws in widely used software; Cyber Verification Program launched

Anthropic has unveiled Claude Mythos Preview, a research-only AI model purpose-built for security tasks, and disclosed that it has used the model to find more than 10,000 high-severity vulnerabilities in widely used open-source and commercial software. Mythos has also been adapted to build end-to-end exploit chains and, in one Glasswing partner-bank case, helped block a $1.5 million fraudulent wire transfer. Anthropic is urging defenders to shorten patch windows because models with similar capability will soon be broadly available. It has launched a Cyber Verification Program that lets vetted researchers use the model without guardrails for legitimate vulnerability research, red teaming, and penetration testing.

Check
Audit your patch SLAs: how fast does a critical CVE move from vendor advisory to production? Aim for under 72 hours on internet-facing services.
Affected
Any organization that relies on adversaries lacking time to develop exploits. Mythos and similar models (OpenAI's GPT-5.5-Cyber) compress the exploit-development timeline dramatically.
Fix
Shorten patch testing and deployment cycles. Harden default configurations. Enforce phishing-resistant MFA. Apply for the Anthropic Cyber Verification Program if you do legitimate vulnerability research.

Laravel-Lang PHP packages compromised - autoload payload steals AWS, Azure, GCP, K8s, Vault, crypto wallets across Linux, macOS, Windows

Aikido Security and Socket have disclosed that several packages in the Laravel-Lang PHP ecosystem were compromised and used to ship a ~5,900-line PHP credential stealer that runs automatically the moment any consumer of the package boots. The dropper registers itself in composer.json under autoload.files, so no class instantiation or method call is needed - the payload triggers on every PHP request. It harvests AWS, Azure, GCP, Kubernetes, HashiCorp Vault, Jenkins, GitLab, GitHub Actions, CircleCI, browser data, password-manager vaults, SSH keys, crypto wallets, and VPN configs, then AES-encrypts the bundle and exfiltrates to flipboxstudio[.]info/exfil. The script then deletes itself to limit forensic recovery.

Check
Audit composer.lock files and Laravel deployments for any laravel-lang/* package installed since 2026-05-15. Search egress logs for traffic to flipboxstudio[.]info. Check src/helpers.php for unfamiliar code.
Affected
Any PHP application that pulled in a compromised laravel-lang package via Composer. The autoload trigger means the payload runs on every request, not just on first use.
Fix
Roll back to a known-clean laravel-lang version and pin via composer.lock. Rotate every cloud credential, SSH key, browser-stored token, and password-vault item reachable from affected hosts.

Ghostwriter (UAC-0057/UNC1151) targets Ukrainian government with Prometheus learning-platform lure, OYSTERSHUCK/OYSTERBLUES, Cobalt Strike payload

CERT-UA has documented a fresh Ghostwriter campaign (also tracked as UAC-0057 and UNC1151) using PDF lures themed around Prometheus, a Ukrainian online learning platform, to target Ukrainian government organizations. The phishing email contains a link to a ZIP that drops a JavaScript file (OYSTERFRESH), which displays a decoy document, writes an encrypted payload (OYSTERBLUES) to the Windows Registry, and downloads a loader (OYSTERSHUCK) that decodes and runs OYSTERBLUES. The final payload is Cobalt Strike. Ghostwriter is a Belarus-linked threat group that has been hitting Ukrainian targets continuously since 2022. CERT-UA recommends restricting wscript.exe for standard user accounts.

Check
Search Windows endpoints in Ukraine-facing operations for wscript.exe execution chains spawning JavaScript files. Look for HTTP POST exfiltration to unfamiliar C2 hosts after PDF email opens.
Affected
Ukrainian government organizations and contractors. Ghostwriter has been Russia and Belarus's most persistent Ukrainian-government-focused APT since 2022. PDF and ZIP attachments are the primary delivery vector.
Fix
Restrict wscript.exe execution for standard user accounts via AppLocker or WDAC. Block .js attachment delivery at the email gateway. Hunt for Cobalt Strike beacons in Ukraine-related operations.

Megalodon GitHub Actions attack scans 5,561 repos for CI/CD secrets; polymarketdev publishes nine wallet-stealer npm packages

SafeDep has detailed Megalodon, a GitHub Actions attack that scans 5,561 repositories for usable CI/CD secrets and credentials by submitting malicious pull requests that contain crafted workflow files. The campaign appears unrelated to the recent TeamPCP supply-chain wave. Separately, a throwaway npm account 'polymarketdev' published nine packages within 30 seconds (polymarket-trading-cli, polymarket-terminal, polymarket-trade, polymarket-auto-trade, polymarket-copy-trading, polymarket-bot, polymarket-claude-code, polymarket-ai-agent, polymarket-trader) that, on postinstall, present a fake wallet onboarding prompt and exfiltrate Ethereum and Polygon private keys to a Cloudflare Worker at polymarketbot.polymarketdev.workers[.]dev. The malicious packages remain live on npm at time of publication.

Check
Search GitHub Actions audit logs for unfamiliar workflow files added via pull requests since May 21. Search npm install logs for any polymarket-* package.
Affected
5,561 GitHub repositories specifically targeted by Megalodon malicious pull requests. Any Ethereum or Polygon developer who installed polymarket-* npm packages exposed wallet keys.
Fix
Restrict workflows triggered by pull_request_target. Pin GitHub Actions to full commit SHAs not tags. Treat any system that ran polymarket-* packages as compromised; rotate wallet keys immediately.

Netherlands seizes 800 servers of Stark Industries successor WorkTitans/THE.Hosting - links to NoName057(16) Russian hacktivists

The Dutch Financial Crime Investigation Service (FIOD) has arrested two men and seized 800 servers during raids on data centers in Dronten and Schiphol-Rijk that hosted infrastructure for cyberattacks, disinformation, and influence operations tied to sanctioned Russian and Belarusian entities. The 57-year-old company director and a 39-year-old connectivity provider face charges of indirectly providing economic resources to EU-sanctioned parties. The web hosting company Stark Industries was sanctioned by the EU last May; investigators say its infrastructure was simply transferred to a newly created Dutch company called WorkTitans B.V., trading under THE.Hosting. Mirhosting, which provided physical colocation and connectivity, denies knowingly supporting illegal operations.

Check
Search egress logs for connections to Stark Industries or THE.Hosting / WorkTitans IP ranges since 2022. Cross-reference with NoName057(16) DDoS infrastructure published by national CERTs.
Affected
Targets of pro-Russian disinformation, DDoS, and influence operations - particularly EU government, banking, and critical-infrastructure sectors. NoName057(16) frequently targets Ukrainian allies.
Fix
Block known Stark Industries / WorkTitans / Mirhosting IP ranges at the perimeter where there is no legitimate business need. Refresh DDoS protection runbooks for NoName057(16) campaigns.

Calypso (Red Lamassu) Chinese APT hits APAC and Middle East telcos with Showboat Linux SOCKS5 backdoor and JMFBackdoor Windows RAT

Lumen Black Lotus Labs and PwC Threat Intelligence have detailed a Chinese cyber-espionage campaign tied to the Calypso group (also tracked as Red Lamassu) that has been hitting telecommunications providers across Asia Pacific and parts of the Middle East since mid-2022. The operators run a Linux post-exploitation framework called Showboat (or kworker) that doubles as a SOCKS5 proxy and port-forwarder, plus a Windows RAT called JMFBackdoor delivered via DLL-sideloading of fltMC.exe + FLTLIB.dll. Showboat retrieves a 'hide' command from public dead-drops like Pastebin to mask its process. The tooling appears to be shared across multiple China-aligned clusters targeting distinct victim sets.

Check
Hunt telco environments for processes named kworker or fltMC.exe with anomalous DLL loads (FLTLIB.dll). Inspect outbound traffic for SOCKS5 traffic to unexpected destinations. Check Pastebin requests.
Affected
Telecommunications providers across Asia Pacific and the Middle East. Multiple China-aligned clusters share the Showboat and JMFBackdoor tooling and certificate-generation patterns across distinct victim sets.
Fix
Block dead-drop dependencies by restricting Pastebin and similar code-paste domains at egress. Hunt for fltMC.exe sideloaded with non-Microsoft FLTLIB.dll. Apply Lumen Black Lotus Labs and PwC IoCs.

First VPN service taken offline by Europol - 33 servers in 27 countries seized, Ukrainian operator questioned, used in ransomware

A joint operation between French, Dutch and 14 other authorities, coordinated by Europol and Eurojust, has taken down First VPN, a privacy-focused VPN service that was advertised on cybercrime forums as a no-logs option that ignored law enforcement requests. Authorities seized 33 servers across 27 countries, took down the 1vpns.com, 1vpns.net, 1vpns.org domains and the onion mirrors, and questioned a Ukrainian suspect. Investigators infiltrated the infrastructure before takedown and pulled the user database, sharing 506 user identifications and 83 intelligence packages internationally. Europol says the service name turned up in nearly every major cybercrime investigation it has supported in recent years.

Check
Search VPN allowlists and detection alerts for users connecting from First VPN exit IPs in the last two years. Check 1vpns.com / 1vpns.net / 1vpns.org references in firewall and proxy logs.
Affected
Investigators or threat hunters whose historical IoC sets included First VPN exit IPs. 506 specific users have been internationally referred; affected parties should expect law-enforcement contact.
Fix
Refresh detection rules with seized First VPN exit IPs once Europol shares them. If your historical attacker IoCs included First VPN nodes, re-correlate against the freshly identified users.

Alleged Kimwolf IoT botmaster 'Dort' arrested in Ottawa, charged in US and Canada - swatting attacks against researchers cited

Krebs on Security reports that Jacob Butler, the 18-year-old Ottawa resident allegedly known online as 'Dort,' has been arrested and charged in both the US and Canada with running the Kimwolf IoT botnet. KrebsOnSecurity unmasked Butler as the operator on February 28 by tying together his email addresses, forum registrations, and public Telegram and Discord posts. Dort later threatened and swatted researchers including Synthient's Ben Brundage. Ontario Provincial Police executed a search warrant in Ottawa on March 19 and seized devices. Kimwolf competed with Aisuru, JackSkid, and Mossad for the same vulnerable-IoT population. Butler faces up to 10 years if extradited and convicted in the US.

Check
Search EDR and netflow telemetry for outbound connections from IoT devices to known Kimwolf, Aisuru, JackSkid, and Mossad C2 sets. Inventory unpatched IoT devices on residential and SMB networks.
Affected
IoT devices - mostly routers, NVRs, and consumer IP cameras - vulnerable to the unpatched flaws Kimwolf was using to spread. Synthient helped patch the underlying weakness earlier this year.
Fix
Update firmware on all IoT and network-edge devices and disable WAN-side admin interfaces. Block known Kimwolf C2 ranges. Monitor for the lateral spread patterns documented by Synthient.

Underminr domain-fronting attack hijacks brand reputations via CDN trust - 42% of websites globally, 51% in US, vulnerable

ADAMnetworks researchers have disclosed Underminr, a domain-fronting attack that abuses how major content delivery networks resolve HTTP requests, letting an attacker route malicious traffic so it appears to come from trusted brand domains. Protective DNS filters see the DNS lookup for the legitimate site and wave it through. ADAMnetworks estimates 42% of websites globally are vulnerable, 51% in the US, around one-third in Eastern Europe, and under 9% in China's heavily-regulated internet. The researchers say attackers are already using the technique. Boutique security-focused CDNs that perform domain verification are not vulnerable; the larger general-purpose providers carry most of the exposure.

Check
Inventory CDN providers and check whether each performs domain verification (validates Host header at edge). Search egress logs for traffic resolving a trusted domain but landing on attacker infrastructure.
Affected
Roughly 42% of websites worldwide, 51% in the US, hosted on CDNs that do not perform strict Host-header verification. Boutique CDNs that verify ownership are not vulnerable.
Fix
Move sensitive properties to CDNs that perform strict domain verification. Audit Protective DNS allowlists and pair them with TLS SNI or HTTP-Host inspection downstream. Treat domain-only allowlists as weak.

Hunt.io: Saudi Telecom hosts 72% of Middle East C2 servers; 1,350+ servers across 98 providers in 14 countries

Hunt.io has mapped 1,350+ command-and-control servers spread across 98 providers in 14 Middle Eastern countries over three months. Saudi Telecom Company (STC) hosts 981 of them - 72.4% of all observed regional C2 - the largest single-provider concentration the researchers have seen globally. Most of STC's hosting appears to be compromised customer systems rather than deliberate bulletproof hosting, but the effect is the same. Other heavy hosts include SERVERS TECH FZCO (UAE), OMC (Israel), Türk Telekom, and Iraqi provider Regxa, which Hunt.io flags as the highest bulletproof-hosting profile observed. Named campaigns hosted on this infrastructure include Eagle Werewolf espionage, DYNOWIPER attacks on Poland's energy sector, and RondoDox.

Check
Add STC, SERVERS TECH FZCO, OMC, Türk Telekom, and Regxa to your provider-level egress monitoring and threat-intel correlation. Pull Hunt.io's published IoC list for the named campaigns.
Affected
Any organization whose users or systems communicate with Middle Eastern infrastructure. Provider-level visibility (versus per-IP) is now the more durable signal as attackers rotate domains and IPs daily.
Fix
Shift detection rules from per-IP IoCs to provider/ASN-level monitoring where business-justified. Block known bulletproof providers like Regxa at egress. Add Cobalt Strike, AsyncRAT, Mirai, and Sliver beacon hunts.