Attackers backdoored several widely used @asyncapi npm packages, together drawing around three million weekly downloads, by hijacking the project's GitHub Actions build pipeline rather than stealing a maintainer's npm token. Because the project's own release workflow published the malicious versions, they carried valid provenance signatures, which prove where a package came from but not that the code was trustworthy. The payload was hidden in normal runtime files behind trailing whitespace and ran when the module was imported, not on install, so defenses aimed at install scripts missed it. Once loaded, it fetched an encrypted second stage, stole credentials and cloud and registry tokens, and planted persistence, even in developer tool configuration files.
Researchers at JFrog found 148 npm packages that abused the registry not to attack developers but as free hosting for a booby-trapped web proxy aimed at students trying to bypass school filters. Anyone who opened one of the proxy sites had their browser quietly conscripted into a distributed denial-of-service botnet, flooding target servers with HTTP and WebSocket traffic, alongside injected ads and tracking. Crucially, the packages contained no install-time scripts and were never meant to be added to a project, so dependency scanners and install sandboxes, which watch what runs on install, would not catch them. The operators can re-arm the dormant attack code with a single commit.
Discount supermarket chain Lidl has notified online shop customers in Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands of a data breach that stemmed from a hack at one of its service providers rather than Lidl's own systems. According to the company, the exposed information involves customer contact and order-related details, while payment card data was not affected. The incident is another example of third-party or supply-chain risk, where attackers compromise a vendor to reach a larger brand's customer data. Even without financial data, the exposed details can fuel convincing phishing and scams that impersonate Lidl, especially messages referencing real orders to make fraudulent requests look legitimate to shoppers who recently used the online shop.
Google and Microsoft removed ModHeader, a header-editing browser extension popular with developers, with about 1.6 million installs, after researchers at Stripe OLT found a hidden browsing-history collector inside the official, signed store version. The collector was dormant, gated off by an empty allow-list, and no evidence has emerged that it ever sent data, but its presence in a trusted, signed extension is the concern. Its design frustrated automated review: the data was encrypted, the upload was switched off so sandboxes saw nothing leave, and malicious code was blended into a legitimate codebase, so scanners rated it low risk. It is a reminder that a store signature proves origin, not safe behavior.
Attackers used a stolen publishing credential to push malicious versions of the jscrambler npm package that install a Rust infostealer as soon as the package is added to a project. Socket ties five bad versions to the same actor, published over about three hours; the malware ships as native binaries for Windows, macOS, and Linux and sweeps developer machines for cloud credentials, crypto wallets, and password-manager vaults. Because jscrambler is a build-time tool used in development and CI, the stealer runs where deploy tokens, cloud keys, and source code live. Partway through, the dropper moved into the package's main code, so installing with scripts disabled does not stop it.
Researchers at Socket uncovered a network of 222 GitHub repositories, tracked as Operation Muck and Load, built to spread Windows malware through a fake Go module posing as a DNS and subdomain scanner. Running the module quietly launches PowerShell that pulls an encrypted payload from attacker infrastructure and deploys infostealers, remote access trojans, and cryptominers. To look trustworthy, the operators used an automated workflow that force-pushes fake commits every minute, making repositories appear actively maintained and generating hundreds of package versions. More than 700 of the module's 1,200-plus versions were malicious. The lures cluster around crypto wallets, Telegram bots, and game cheats, aimed at people likely to run untrusted code.
Attackers compromised a legitimate maintainer's GitHub account for the Injective blockchain SDK and used it to push a malicious version of the widely used @injectivelabs/sdk-ts npm package, which has around 50,000 weekly downloads. The tainted code, disguised as usage telemetry, hooked the SDK's wallet key-generation functions to capture private keys and seed phrases, then sent them to a server made to look like legitimate Injective infrastructure. Trusted-publishing automation spread the malicious release across 18 packages within minutes, though it was live under an hour before being pulled. Because the theft can reach apps that used the SDK only indirectly, any wallet keys handled by affected versions should be treated as compromised.
Researchers have shown an attack, called HalluSquatting, that weaponizes the tendency of AI coding assistants to invent plausible-sounding names for software packages that do not exist. The attackers work out which fake names an AI reliably hallucinates, register those names first on a package registry or GitHub, and upload a trap that instructs the coding agent to install a reverse shell or runs code directly. When the assistant fetches the made-up dependency on a developer's machine, it runs the attacker's payload. Tested against nine AI coding assistants, the technique could let attackers pool compromised developer machines into a botnet for crypto mining, denial-of-service attacks, or ransomware.
Socket found a coordinated campaign of 17 malicious packages on npm and PyPI that impersonate the payment SDKs for Paysafe, Skrill, and Neteller to steal developer and cloud credentials. The fake libraries mimic real SDKs, returning success responses without contacting the real services, while quietly harvesting environment secrets such as Paysafe API keys, AWS keys, and GitHub and npm tokens and sending them to a server on AWS. Because these packages get pulled into build pipelines, a single one reaching a continuous integration runner can hand over the broad credentials those runners hold. The npm versions trigger when a payment key is present; the PyPI versions run on install regardless.
The FBI has issued an alert about TeamPCP, a criminal group that compromises the developer and security tools organizations trust inside their build pipelines to steal cloud credentials at scale. Rather than targeting end users, TeamPCP injects malicious code into legitimate software such as the Trivy and KICS scanners and the LiteLLM library, then pushes trojanized updates that continuous integration systems pull in automatically. Its malware harvests AWS, Google Cloud, and Azure tokens, Kubernetes service-account credentials, and more. One technique the FBI highlights is taking over npm maintainer accounts by re-registering the maintainer's long-expired recovery email domain, then using password reset to publish malicious package versions.