Last updated: August 19, 2026 at 1:47 AM UTC
All 741 Vulnerability 286 Breach 129 Threat 319 Defense 7
Tag: supply-chain (108 articles)Clear

codexui-android npm steals OpenAI Codex auth tokens for a month - non-expiring refresh_token exfiltrated to fake Sentry endpoint

Aikido Security has disclosed that codexui-android, an npm package advertised as a remote web UI for OpenAI Codex with over 29,000 weekly downloads, has been silently exfiltrating users' Codex authentication tokens for the past month. Unlike a typosquat, the malware was embedded into a functional, actively-developed package roughly a month after publication to build trust; the GitHub repo stayed clean. The code reads ~/.codex/auth.json and ships the access_token, refresh_token, id_token, and account ID to sentry.anyclaw[.]store, a server masquerading as Sentry. The non-expiring refresh_token lets an attacker silently impersonate the developer indefinitely with full Codex account access. The package remains available; the npm account is 'friuns.'

Check
Inventory developer machines for the codexui-android npm package. If present, treat ~/.codex/auth.json as compromised. Search egress for traffic to sentry.anyclaw[.]store.
Affected
Developers who installed codexui-android (29K weekly downloads, still live). Stolen non-expiring Codex refresh_tokens give attackers persistent, silent impersonation of the victim's OpenAI Codex account.
Fix
Remove codexui-android. Revoke and re-issue OpenAI Codex sessions; the refresh_token does not expire, so rotation is mandatory. Pin dependencies and audit AI-tooling packages before install.

Malicious 'Sicoob.Sdk' NuGet steals Brazilian banking PFX certificates via hardcoded Sentry endpoint - amplified by Google Search AI Mode

Socket has flagged a malicious NuGet package, Sicoob.Sdk (versions 2.0.0-2.0.4), that masquerades as a C# SDK for Sicoob, one of Brazil's largest cooperative financial systems, and steals PFX certificates used to authenticate businesses with Sicoob's banking APIs. When a developer instantiates SicoobClient, the package reads the PFX file from disk, Base64-encodes it, and exfiltrates the client ID, PFX password, and encoded certificate to a hardcoded third-party Sentry endpoint. It also captures raw Boleto API responses. The package was downloaded ~500 times and the publisher has 11 other NuGet packages with ~6,000 combined downloads. Google Search AI Mode reportedly amplified the package as legitimate.

Check
Inventory C# projects for Sicoob.Sdk versions 2.0.0-2.0.4 and the publisher's 11 other packages. Search outbound traffic to the attacker Sentry endpoint identified in Socket's IoCs.
Affected
C# developers integrating with Sicoob banking APIs in Brazil. Any project that pulled Sicoob.Sdk via NuGet had PFX certificates, client IDs, and Boleto data harvested.
Fix
Remove all 12 affected NuGet packages and rotate every Sicoob PFX certificate and client credential reachable from affected hosts. Verify NuGet package signatures match expected GitHub source going forward.

CrowdStrike, Google, Shadowserver disrupt GlassWorm botnet by cutting four resilient C2 channels - Solana memos, BitTorrent DHT, Google Calendar, direct VPS

CrowdStrike, Google, and The Shadowserver Foundation have disrupted the GlassWorm developer-supply-chain botnet by simultaneously cutting four resilient command-and-control channels. Active since October 2025, GlassWorm spread through malicious OpenVSX and VS Code extensions, GitHub repos, and npm packages (one March campaign hit 400+ artifacts), stealing crypto wallets and developer credentials. Its C2 was built to resist takedown: server addresses encoded in Solana transaction memo fields, configuration stored in the BitTorrent DHT, Base64 C2 paths hidden in Google Calendar event titles, and direct VPS connections for payload delivery. All four had to fall at once. Infected hosts now beacon to CrowdStrike's sinkhole at 164.92.88[.]210.

Check
Run CrowdStrike's published YARA rules across developer workstations and build servers. Search network logs for beacons to 164.92.88[.]210 (CrowdStrike sinkhole) indicating prior GlassWorm infection.
Affected
Developers who installed malicious OpenVSX or VS Code extensions, or pulled compromised GitHub repos and npm packages since October 2025. 400+ artifacts hit in the March campaign alone.
Fix
Remediate any host beaconing to the sinkhole. Audit installed OpenVSX/VS Code extensions against known-bad lists. Rotate crypto wallets and developer credentials exposed on infected machines.

Malicious npm package 'mouse5212-super-formatter' steals files from Claude AI /mnt/user-data directory, exfiltrates to attacker GitHub via postinstall

OX Security has flagged a malicious npm package, mouse5212-super-formatter (campaign codenamed Malware-Slop), designed to exfiltrate files from /mnt/user-data - the directory Anthropic's Claude uses to handle uploads and outputs. The package presents itself as an 'archive deployment sync' utility but, during the postinstall stage, authenticates to GitHub using a token found in the victim's environment (or a hard-coded fallback), creates an attacker-controlled repository, and recursively uploads every local file. It writes a fake 'network connections' log to disguise the theft. The package leaked its own GitHub token, suggesting AI-generated malware with poor OPSEC. It has ~676 downloads and remains live on npm.

Check
Search npm install logs and CI/CD for mouse5212-super-formatter. On any host that ran it, audit /mnt/user-data access and outbound GitHub API calls. Rotate exposed GitHub tokens.
Affected
Developers and AI-tooling users who installed mouse5212-super-formatter (676 downloads, still live). Systems with Claude's /mnt/user-data directory and a GitHub token in the environment are the target.
Fix
Remove the package and pin dependencies via lockfile. Rotate every GitHub token reachable from affected hosts. Treat uploaded/output files in /mnt/user-data as potentially exfiltrated.

TrapDoor cross-ecosystem supply chain hits npm, PyPI, Crates.io with 34+ malicious packages; plants .cursorrules and CLAUDE.md to trick AI assistants

Socket has detailed TrapDoor, a coordinated cross-ecosystem supply-chain campaign that has published 34+ malicious packages across 384+ versions on npm, PyPI, and Crates.io since May 22. Targets are crypto, DeFi, Solana, and AI developers. The npm packages deploy trap-core.js, which scans for credentials, validates AWS and GitHub tokens via API, and persists via cron, systemd, Git hooks, shell rcfiles, and SSH; Rust crates use build.rs to trigger; Python packages auto-execute on import to fetch JavaScript from ddjidd564.github[.]io. Notable twist: the campaign also plants .cursorrules and CLAUDE.md in PRs to popular AI repos to trick AI coding assistants into running 'security scans' that exfiltrate secrets.

Check
Search npm, pip, and cargo install logs across CI/CD and developer machines for any of the 34+ TrapDoor packages. Check repos for unsolicited .cursorrules or CLAUDE.md additions in PRs.
Affected
Crypto, DeFi, Solana, and AI developers who install packages by name without lockfile pinning. Users of AI coding assistants (Cursor, Claude) that read .cursorrules or CLAUDE.md.
Fix
Pin via lockfiles. Block ddjidd564.github[.]io at egress. Audit .cursorrules and CLAUDE.md across repos. Configure AI coding assistants to require explicit confirmation before running arbitrary commands from project files.

Packagist supply-chain attack hits 8 Composer packages with cross-ecosystem package.json hook downloading Linux binary to /tmp/.sshd

Socket has detailed a coordinated supply-chain campaign that planted malicious code in eight Composer packages on Packagist, including moritz-sauer-13/silverstripe-cms-theme, crosiersource/crosierlib-base, devdojo/wave, devdojo/genesis, katanaui/katana, elitedevsquad/sidecar-laravel, r2luna/brain, and baskarcm/tzi-chat-ui. The attackers placed the payload not in composer.json but in package.json - meaning teams scanning only PHP dependencies would miss the Node.js lifecycle hook bundled inside. The postinstall script downloads a Linux binary from a GitHub Releases URL (github[.]com/parikhpreyash4/systemd-network-helper-aa5c751f), saves it as /tmp/.sshd, and runs it backgrounded with execute permissions. Socket found the same payload referenced in 777 GitHub files, including two GitHub Actions workflows - hinting at a broader campaign.

Check
Audit composer.lock and package.json across PHP projects for the 8 affected packages installed since 2026-05-20. Block egress to github[.]com/parikhpreyash4/* and check /tmp/.sshd presence on Linux build hosts.
Affected
Any project that installed moritz-sauer-13/silverstripe-cms-theme, crosiersource/crosierlib-base, devdojo/wave, devdojo/genesis, katanaui/katana, elitedevsquad/sidecar-laravel, r2luna/brain, or baskarcm/tzi-chat-ui via Composer. Hidden in package.json so PHP-only scanners miss it.
Fix
Roll affected packages back to clean versions; pin via composer.lock and package-lock.json. Rotate developer and CI credentials reachable from affected hosts. Scan PHP repos for package.json lifecycle hooks.

GitHub ships npm 11.15.0 with 2FA-gated staging, OIDC trusted publishing, and per-source install flags in response to TeamPCP wave

GitHub has shipped npm CLI 11.15.0 introducing a 'staging' workflow that lets maintainers run 'npm stage publish' to push a candidate to a staging area before going live - with the constraint that the package must already exist on the registry and have 2FA enabled on the account. Three new install flags (--allow-file, --allow-remote, --allow-directory) extend the existing --allow-git to give developers an explicit allowlist for every non-registry install source. GitHub is also encouraging maintainers to pair staging with trusted publishing via OIDC. The changes respond to the TeamPCP supply-chain wave that compromised hundreds of packages over the past several weeks.

Check
Inventory developer machines using npm CLI. Upgrade to 11.15.0+ to access the staging workflow. Identify high-impact packages your team publishes and require 2FA on those maintainer accounts.
Affected
Any npm publisher whose tokens or maintainer accounts could be hijacked. The TeamPCP wave hit 600+ packages in one hour on May 19 by abusing maintainer accounts.
Fix
Adopt 'npm stage publish' for production packages. Enable 2FA on all maintainer accounts. Configure trusted publishing via OIDC where supported. Apply --allow-file / --allow-remote / --allow-directory selectively in CI.

Laravel-Lang PHP packages compromised - autoload payload steals AWS, Azure, GCP, K8s, Vault, crypto wallets across Linux, macOS, Windows

Aikido Security and Socket have disclosed that several packages in the Laravel-Lang PHP ecosystem were compromised and used to ship a ~5,900-line PHP credential stealer that runs automatically the moment any consumer of the package boots. The dropper registers itself in composer.json under autoload.files, so no class instantiation or method call is needed - the payload triggers on every PHP request. It harvests AWS, Azure, GCP, Kubernetes, HashiCorp Vault, Jenkins, GitLab, GitHub Actions, CircleCI, browser data, password-manager vaults, SSH keys, crypto wallets, and VPN configs, then AES-encrypts the bundle and exfiltrates to flipboxstudio[.]info/exfil. The script then deletes itself to limit forensic recovery.

Check
Audit composer.lock files and Laravel deployments for any laravel-lang/* package installed since 2026-05-15. Search egress logs for traffic to flipboxstudio[.]info. Check src/helpers.php for unfamiliar code.
Affected
Any PHP application that pulled in a compromised laravel-lang package via Composer. The autoload trigger means the payload runs on every request, not just on first use.
Fix
Roll back to a known-clean laravel-lang version and pin via composer.lock. Rotate every cloud credential, SSH key, browser-stored token, and password-vault item reachable from affected hosts.

Megalodon GitHub Actions attack scans 5,561 repos for CI/CD secrets; polymarketdev publishes nine wallet-stealer npm packages

SafeDep has detailed Megalodon, a GitHub Actions attack that scans 5,561 repositories for usable CI/CD secrets and credentials by submitting malicious pull requests that contain crafted workflow files. The campaign appears unrelated to the recent TeamPCP supply-chain wave. Separately, a throwaway npm account 'polymarketdev' published nine packages within 30 seconds (polymarket-trading-cli, polymarket-terminal, polymarket-trade, polymarket-auto-trade, polymarket-copy-trading, polymarket-bot, polymarket-claude-code, polymarket-ai-agent, polymarket-trader) that, on postinstall, present a fake wallet onboarding prompt and exfiltrate Ethereum and Polygon private keys to a Cloudflare Worker at polymarketbot.polymarketdev.workers[.]dev. The malicious packages remain live on npm at time of publication.

Check
Search GitHub Actions audit logs for unfamiliar workflow files added via pull requests since May 21. Search npm install logs for any polymarket-* package.
Affected
5,561 GitHub repositories specifically targeted by Megalodon malicious pull requests. Any Ethereum or Polygon developer who installed polymarket-* npm packages exposed wallet keys.
Fix
Restrict workflows triggered by pull_request_target. Pin GitHub Actions to full commit SHAs not tags. Treat any system that ran polymarket-* packages as compromised; rotate wallet keys immediately.

GitHub confirms 3,800 internal repos stolen after employee installed malicious Nx Console VS Code extension (TeamPCP)

GitHub has confirmed that roughly 3,800 internal repositories were exfiltrated after one of its employees installed a malicious version of the Nx Console VS Code extension. The malicious extension has been pulled and the affected device has been isolated. GitHub's current assessment is that the activity was limited to internal repos and that no customer data stored outside them was touched. The numbers line up with the claim TeamPCP posted on Breached, where they offered the code for at least $50,000. The breach connects this week's Nx Console compromise to the broader TeamPCP campaign that also hit OpenAI and Grafana.

Check
Identify VS Code endpoints with the Nx Console extension. Confirm version is 18.100.0 or newer. Check for cat.py and kitty-monitor IoCs and outbound traffic to attacker C2 published by Nx.
Affected
Any developer machine that installed Nx Console 18.95.0 during the 11-minute window on May 18 (12:36-12:47 UTC). GitHub.com itself confirms 3,800 internal repos exfiltrated from one employee device.
Fix
Update to Nx Console 18.100.0. Audit access from GitHub-employee or contractor devices; rotate every credential, token, and SSH key reachable from machines that ran the trojanized version.