Last updated: August 19, 2026 at 1:47 AM UTC
All 741 Vulnerability 286 Breach 129 Threat 319 Defense 7

Pro-Ukrainian hackers chain three TrueConf bugs to deploy web shells and create rogue admin accounts in Russian networks (CVE chain patched August 2025)

Russian security firm Positive Technologies attributed an ongoing intrusion campaign to PhantomCore, a pro-Ukrainian group also tracked as Head Mare, Rainbow Hyena, and UNG0901. The group is chaining three TrueConf video-conferencing vulnerabilities (patched by the vendor August 27, 2025) to bypass authentication and run commands on TrueConf servers in Russian organizations. After break-in, they drop a PHP web shell, create a rogue user named 'TrueConf2' with admin rights on the conferencing server, and pivot into the wider network using tools including Velociraptor, Memprocfs, DumpIt, and custom backdoors MacTunnelRAT and PhantomSscp. First attacks observed mid-September 2025.

Check
Check every TrueConf Server install in your environment is patched to August 27, 2025 or later, and audit user accounts for any named 'TrueConf2' or similar.
Affected
TrueConf Server installations unpatched since August 27, 2025 - any organization that delayed the August update is exposed. Critical infrastructure, defense, and government organizations using TrueConf for offline-capable conferencing are particularly exposed because TrueConf is heavily used in those sectors.
Fix
Update TrueConf Server to the August 27, 2025 release or later. Audit local TrueConf admin accounts for unfamiliar usernames - the rogue 'TrueConf2' account is a defining indicator. Hunt server logs for PHP web shell activity and TrueConf-server outbound connections to unfamiliar domains. PhantomCore typically pivots into the broader network within days.

Telecom fraud campaign uses fake CAPTCHAs to trick people into sending SMS to premium-rate numbers in 17 countries - 50+ international charges per victim

Infoblox documented a telecom fraud campaign active since June 2020 that uses fake CAPTCHA verification pages to trick mobile users into sending SMS to premium-rate numbers, racking up dozens of international charges per victim. The operation runs across 35 phone numbers in 17 countries with high-fee destinations like Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. Each fake CAPTCHA pre-populates the SMS field with a dozen recipients - so one tap charges the victim for 50+ international texts. Charges show up on bills weeks later, long after the fake CAPTCHA is forgotten. A separate finding: 120+ campaigns abusing the legitimate Keitaro traffic-distribution tool to route victims into the same scams plus crypto wallet-drainers.

Check
Brief mobile-using staff that any 'CAPTCHA' asking them to send a text message is a scam, regardless of what brand or service the page claims to represent.
Affected
Mobile users in any region, particularly those who hit ad-tracker links from social media (Facebook ads were a primary entry point in the Keitaro variant). Corporate phones with international SMS allowed by default are at acute risk because charges may not appear until the next monthly bill cycle and may run into thousands of dollars.
Fix
On corporate mobile fleets, disable international SMS by default and enable only on request with a documented business reason - this stops the fraud at the carrier level. Audit recent corporate-phone bills for unexpected international SMS charges. Brief staff that real CAPTCHAs never ask for an SMS. Block known Keitaro TDS domains at the corporate DNS resolver.

Italy extradites Chinese national accused of running spear-phishing operation against US Covid researchers - first such extradition from Europe to US

Italy extradited Chinese national Xu Zewei to the US on Friday, where he is accused of running a years-long Chinese government-linked spear-phishing campaign that targeted US Covid-19 researchers, universities, and law firms. The case is notable because it's the first time a European country has extradited a Chinese state-linked hacker to the US, and signals tighter coordination between European and US prosecutors on China-attributed cyber operations. Xu was arrested in Milan in July 2024 on a US warrant; Italy's highest court approved the extradition this month after his appeals were exhausted. He could spend decades in US federal prison.

Check
If your research, healthcare, or legal organization worked on Covid-related materials, expect renewed targeting from China-linked groups now that one of their operators faces US prosecution.
Affected
Universities, research labs, hospitals, and law firms that worked on Covid-19 vaccine development, treatment research, public health policy, or related litigation between 2020 and 2024. Organizations named in the Xu Zewei indictment are at high risk for retaliation. More broadly: any organization holding biomedical research IP, particularly with Chinese researchers in their network.
Fix
Brief researchers and legal staff on the spear-phishing pattern: emails from people they actually know asking for documents or login help, with subtle indicators like off-pattern grammar or unusual sender domains. Add MFA to research-data and legal-discovery systems. Monitor outbound transfers of research datasets to unfamiliar destinations. Treat the extradition as a likely catalyst for retaliatory campaigns.

ADT customer breach details now public on Have I Been Pwned - 5.5 million records confirmed, more than the 10 million ShinyHunters originally claimed but with worse data

Update on the ADT breach we covered April 25: Have I Been Pwned added the leaked dataset yesterday with 5,488,888 unique email addresses confirmed - lower than ShinyHunters' original 10 million claim but still the largest US home-security customer leak on record. Beyond the email, name, phone, and address fields ADT originally disclosed, the leak includes details ADT downplayed: account creation dates, premise types, internal account flags, ADT installer IDs, and prospect/customer status. None catastrophic alone, but combined gives attackers enough context to run convincing 'security audit' phone scams against named customers with real install dates and installer names.

Check
If you're an ADT customer, treat any inbound call referencing your real install date or installer name as hostile - those details are now public.
Affected
All 5,488,888 ADT customers and prospects - now indexable on HIBP. Acute risk for customers whose installer IDs are in the leak: scammers can call referencing 'Mike from your install on March 14, 2022' and sound legitimate enough to social-engineer security code resets. Elderly customers and high-value households are the highest-risk segment for follow-on physical security scams.
Fix
ADT customers should set a verbal codeword with ADT's real customer service line and refuse to verify identity to any inbound caller without it. Treat any 'free security upgrade' as a scam unless you initiated the call. Brief elderly family members specifically - they're the prime target for follow-on scams using leaked install details. Pressure ADT for credit monitoring if the SSN/Tax ID subset includes you.

Udemy customer and instructor data leaked publicly after ShinyHunters' extortion deadline expires - 1.4 million records including PayPal payout details

Online learning giant Udemy's customer and instructor data was leaked publicly today after the company refused to pay ShinyHunters' extortion demand. Have I Been Pwned added the breach yesterday with 1.4 million unique email addresses. The dataset goes well beyond contact information: it includes full names, physical addresses, phone numbers, employer details, and instructor payout methods - PayPal email addresses, mailing addresses for cheques, and bank transfer details. Udemy was listed on ShinyHunters' 'pay or leak' portal April 24 with a three-day deadline. The company has not publicly confirmed the breach or said how attackers got in.

Check
Reset your Udemy password if you have an account, especially if you're an instructor with payout details on file, and watch for highly targeted phishing.
Affected
Udemy customers and instructors with accounts before April 2026, particularly instructors whose PayPal addresses, cheque mailing addresses, and bank transfer details are in the leak. Any organization using Udemy for staff training has employee details exposed and should expect tailored phishing referencing real course history.
Fix
Reset Udemy passwords and rotate any password reused on other accounts. Instructors should monitor PayPal and bank accounts and contact PayPal to flag the email as compromised. Brief staff that any 'Udemy' email referencing their real course history is potentially hostile - go to udemy.com directly rather than clicking links. Add Udemy lookalike domains to your DMARC monitoring.

Litecoin's privacy layer was attacked using a vulnerability that had been patched in private 37 days earlier - cross-chain swaps lost ~$600,000

Litecoin's privacy add-on, called MWEB, was attacked over the weekend in a way that forced the network to rewind 13 blocks of history (about 32 minutes) to undo invalid transactions. The interesting part for non-crypto people: developers had quietly fixed the bug between March 19 and 26 but never required mining pools to actually deploy the fix. Some pools updated, some didn't. Attackers waited 37 days and exploited the gap between patched and unpatched nodes, draining roughly $600,000 from cross-chain swap protocols including NEAR Intents. The pattern - quiet fix followed by slow rollout - is the same coordination failure that bites every distributed system, not just blockchains.

Check
Audit your patch coordination process: when a critical vulnerability is privately fixed, do you require all affected operators to deploy it or just publish the fix and hope?
Affected
Distributed systems where some nodes can be patched while others continue running vulnerable code without breaking the network - blockchains, federated services, mesh networks, multi-tenant SaaS with on-prem agents. Cross-chain bridges and DEX protocols are exposed when one chain's nodes disagree about transaction validity.
Fix
When shipping a critical patch, treat 'we shipped the fix' and 'all affected operators deployed it' as separate milestones with separate metrics. For products you depend on, watch for vendor advisories that mention private fixes shipped earlier than the public disclosure. Monitor cross-chain exposure if your treasury or DeFi positions touch Litecoin or related protocols. Check that vendors have a process for requiring updates.

Russia behind Signal phishing campaign that compromised Bundestag President Julia Klöckner - 300+ German officials affected

Der Spiegel reported on April 25 that German government sources now blame Russia for a large-scale Signal phishing campaign that compromised the account of Bundestag President Julia Klöckner. At least 300 Signal accounts of German political figures were targeted; investigators say attackers accessed chat histories, files, and phone numbers. Chancellor Friedrich Merz was in the same CDU group chat as Klöckner but his device showed no signs of compromise. The attack used pure social engineering - operators posed as Signal support and asked victims to share verification codes or PINs.

Check
Brief executives, board members, and political-staff who use Signal that anyone messaging them claiming to be 'Signal support' is hostile - Signal never asks for codes by message.
Affected
Signal users in any role attractive to a state intelligence service: politicians, military, diplomats, defense contractors, investigative journalists, NGOs working on Russia or Ukraine, and the executives and assistants of all of the above. The attack works by tricking users into sharing codes - it does not exploit a Signal flaw.
Fix
Train high-risk staff that Signal will never ask for verification codes via message. Enable Signal's Registration Lock PIN. Periodically check Linked Devices and remove anything unfamiliar. Add detection for Signal phishing pages on perimeter URL filters and add Signal account-takeover scenarios to your tabletop catalogue.

Researchers find 20-year-old malware that secretly faked engineering math results

Researchers at SentinelOne found malware from 2005 that did something nobody had documented before: it quietly made engineering simulation programs give wrong answers. Instead of stealing data or crashing systems, it tampered with the math behind tools like LS-DYNA (used to design things like car crash safety and weapons), so the results looked normal but were subtly off. The malware, called fast16, is older than Stuxnet - the famous attack on Iran's nuclear program - by five years. Its name appears in leaked NSA files, suggesting the US built it. Discovered via an old file uploaded to VirusTotal in 2016.

Check
If your environment includes engineering or scientific simulation software (LS-DYNA, PKPM, MOHID, ANSYS), treat the SentinelOne IoCs as a hunt opportunity even on legacy hardware.
Affected
Organizations using high-precision engineering simulation tools - LS-DYNA, PKPM structural analysis, MOHID hydrodynamics - in defense, civil engineering, energy, automotive, or research contexts. The fast16 driver only runs on pre-Windows 7 single-core hardware, so the active risk is forensic. The calculation-corruption pattern is the threat model worth understanding.
Fix
Pull SentinelOne's published YARA rules and IoCs and run them against archived disk images, retired engineering workstations, and air-gapped pre-2010 systems. The broader operational lesson: treat simulation outputs as a high-value target. Audit who can modify simulation binaries, sign and verify simulation results, and add integrity checks to long-running calculation pipelines.

Attackers planted 73 fake VS Code extensions on Open VSX as 'sleepers' that pretended to be popular tools, then quietly turned malicious

Socket reported 73 newly identified malicious extensions on Open VSX, the marketplace used by VS Code, Cursor, and Windsurf editors. The extensions impersonate popular developer tools - same name, same icon, but published by newly-created GitHub accounts with empty repositories. Instead of being malicious from day one, they sit harmlessly for weeks gathering downloads and trust, then push a 'normal' update that silently installs malware. Six of the 73 extensions have already activated; the rest are still in the sleeper phase. The campaign is part of GlassWorm, an ongoing supply-chain attack family that has been working its way through npm, GitHub, and editor extension marketplaces since 2025.

Check
Check every developer machine and CI runner for editor extensions, verify each publisher matches the official one, and remove anything you can't account for.
Affected
Developers using VS Code, Cursor, Windsurf, or other Open VSX-compatible editors who installed extensions in the past two months. Particularly risky if your team installs popular extensions by name without checking publisher namespace, or auto-updates extensions without review. Sleeper extensions look identical to legitimate ones, so visual checks alone are insufficient.
Fix
List installed extensions in each editor and cross-check the publisher against the legitimate one (microsoft.* for Microsoft tools, the original project's GitHub for others). Remove any with newly-created publishers or mismatched namespaces. Disable auto-update on extensions in higher-risk environments. Allowlist approved extensions in managed dev environments. Socket's GlassWorm v2 page tracks the 73 by name.

Two Windows Defender zero-days that disable the antivirus are still unpatched two weeks after researcher leaked them - attackers now chaining them with custom malware

Update on the Windows Defender zero-day situation: Huntress now confirms attackers are chaining the three flaws leaked April 3 by a researcher called 'Chaotic Eclipse' to deploy a custom tunneling agent named 'BeigeBurrow' on victim systems. Microsoft patched one of the three (BlueHammer, CVE-2026-33825) on April 14, but the other two are still unpatched two weeks later: RedSun lets attackers gain SYSTEM privileges even on patched machines, and UnDefend stops Defender from receiving signature updates - effectively turning off the antivirus. CISA gave federal agencies until May 6 to deploy the BlueHammer patch.

Check
Verify every Windows endpoint has the April 14 patch installed, and treat any host where Defender hasn't received signature updates in over 48 hours as suspicious.
Affected
Windows 10, Windows 11, and Windows Server 2019 and later with Defender enabled. The April 14 patch closes only BlueHammer (CVE-2026-33825); RedSun (privilege escalation, no patch) and UnDefend (Defender update blocker, no patch) still affect every Windows endpoint regardless of patch status. Hands-on-keyboard exploitation is now confirmed in the wild.
Fix
Deploy the April 14 patch to every Windows endpoint and verify with MDM rather than trusting WSUS compliance numbers. Alert when a host's Defender signatures fall more than 48 hours out of date - that's the UnDefend tell. Watch for the enumeration commands Huntress documented on workstations: 'whoami /priv', 'cmdkey /list', 'net group' are unusual outside admin tooling. Block known BeigeBurrow command-and-control IPs.