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Last updated: May 13, 2026 at 5:42 AM UTC
All 208 Vulnerability 72 Breach 41 Threat 88 Defense 7

Checkmarx confirms its source code, employee database, and cloud credentials were posted on the dark web after the March supply-chain attack

Checkmarx confirmed Friday that data from its private GitHub repository was posted on the dark web following the March 23 TeamPCP supply-chain attack. The LAPSUS$ group published the dump, which includes Checkmarx source code, an employee database, API keys, and MongoDB and MySQL credentials. Checkmarx says the affected GitHub repository was separate from the customer Checkmarx One SaaS production environment, with no customer data stored in it. The bigger picture: an attack that started by poisoning a single GitHub Action 35 days ago has now produced a full source code, credentials, and employee data leak - under five weeks end to end.

Check
If your team uses Checkmarx KICS or AST GitHub Actions, the Checkmarx Open VSX extensions, or any Checkmarx self-hosted product, rotate every credential issued during March.
Affected
Organizations using Checkmarx KICS or AST GitHub Action versions pulled between 12:58 and 16:50 UTC on March 23. Checkmarx Open VSX extensions ast-results 2.53.0 and cx-dev-assist 1.7.0. Any environment where Checkmarx-issued API keys reach cloud accounts, repos, or CI/CD secret stores - those credentials may be in the leak.
Fix
Rotate every credential, API key, and integration token that touched Checkmarx tooling in March. Audit GitHub Actions logs for outbound traffic to checkmarx[.]zone or audit.checkmarx.cx. Pin GitHub Actions to immutable commit SHAs rather than version tags. Treat any Checkmarx-issued auth token from March as burned and reissue. Watch for follow-up phishing referencing real Checkmarx employees.

ADT confirms breach after ShinyHunters claims 10 million records stolen via vishing-compromised Okta SSO and Salesforce exfil

ADT, the largest US home security company, filed an SEC 8-K on April 24 confirming a breach detected April 20. ShinyHunters listed ADT on its 'pay or leak' portal claiming over 10 million records with an April 27 deadline. ADT says the dataset was limited to names, phone numbers, addresses, plus DOBs and last-four SSN/Tax IDs for a small subset; no payment data was accessed and alarm systems were unaffected. Initial access was a vishing attack against an employee that compromised an Okta SSO session, which attackers used to reach ADT's Salesforce - the same playbook ShinyHunters ran against Carnival.

Check
If you run Salesforce behind Okta or another SSO, audit conditional-access policies this week and assume vishing-driven session-hijack is a credible vector for your tenant.
Affected
ADT customers, particularly the prospective customers confirmed in the dataset. From a security standpoint: any organization using Salesforce behind SSO without device-bound auth or per-session re-auth on bulk exports. The pattern across ShinyHunters victims (Carnival, ADT, Zara, 7-Eleven) shows MFA alone does not stop this group once help-desk vishing succeeds.
Fix
Brief frontline staff on the vishing pattern: spoofed VoIP, attacker poses as IT, walks user through MFA enrollment. Run a tabletop. In Okta and Entra ID, alert on new device registrations and on bulk Salesforce exports outside business hours. Tighten Permission Set Groups for bulk exports. Consider FIDO2 or platform passkeys for any role with bulk customer-data access.

US utility tech giant Itron breached - hackers reached internal IT systems but no impact on the 112 million customer endpoints it manages

Itron, the Washington-based utility technology company that manages 112 million energy and water meter endpoints across 7,700 customers in 100 countries, disclosed a cyberattack in an SEC 8-K filing April 24. An unauthorized third party reached parts of Itron's corporate IT network on April 13. Itron says it has expelled the attackers and seen no follow-up activity, and that customer-hosted environments (the actual utility infrastructure) were untouched. No ransomware group has claimed the attack. The incident is significant because Itron sits in the middle of US critical infrastructure - meter data, billing, and grid telemetry pass through its software at thousands of utilities.

Check
If you work with any utility tech vendor, confirm in writing whether your relationship touches their corporate IT or only their isolated customer-hosted environment.
Affected
Utilities running Itron software, meters, or services - particularly those whose contracts let Itron staff reach into utility systems. Any organization where a critical-infrastructure vendor has remote access without strict segmentation. Itron's segregation of customer-hosted from corporate IT is what limited this incident.
Fix
Review which Itron-side accounts can reach your utility infrastructure and rotate any credentials, API keys, or VPN profiles Itron staff have used since January. Demand a written attestation that customer-hosted environments are network-segregated from corporate IT. Map every critical-infrastructure vendor's reachability into your network, including informal paths.

Medtronic confirms breach after ShinyHunters claims theft of 9 million records and terabytes of internal data

Medtronic, the world's largest medical device maker, confirmed a breach of its corporate IT systems in an SEC filing April 24. ShinyHunters had listed Medtronic on its leak site April 18 claiming theft of more than 9 million records of personal data plus terabytes of internal corporate documents, with an April 21 deadline. The Medtronic listing has since been removed - a strong signal the company either paid the ransom or is still negotiating. Medtronic says product safety, manufacturing, distribution, and patient care are unaffected; the breach was confined to corporate IT, which is segregated from device infrastructure. Investigation into what personal data was exposed is ongoing.

Check
If you or staff have ever been a Medtronic patient, vendor, contractor, or applicant, watch for highly-targeted phishing referencing real medical device or employment details.
Affected
Medtronic patients (90,000+ employees, hundreds of millions of patients), suppliers, and former staff are all in scope until Medtronic clarifies what 9M+ records contain. Healthcare organizations sharing patient data with Medtronic for device monitoring, recall tracking, or research are exposed if those communications are in the leak.
Fix
Affected individuals: enable MFA on patient portals, monitor explanation-of-benefits statements, and report any unsolicited medical-device prompt or service call. Healthcare organizations: pull your data-sharing inventory with medical device vendors and confirm breach-notification SLAs. Companies sharing confidential records with Medtronic should assume those documents may be in the leak set.

Carnival confirms 7.5 million Holland America Mariner Society loyalty records leaked after ShinyHunters refused extortion deadline

Carnival Corporation has been confirmed as a ShinyHunters breach victim, and the data is now public. Have I Been Pwned added the breach on April 23 with 7,531,359 unique email addresses drawn from 8.7 million records. The data comes from the Mariner Society loyalty program operated by Holland America Line, one of Carnival's cruise brands, and contains full names, dates of birth, genders, email addresses, and loyalty program status fields. ShinyHunters initially listed Carnival on its 'pay or leak' portal on April 18 with an April 21 deadline alongside Zara, 7-Eleven, and roughly 40 other organizations. When Carnival did not pay, the group published the dataset on its leak site this week. Carnival confirmed to reporters that the initial access came from a phishing compromise of a single employee account - a reminder that ShinyHunters continues to rely on human-layer intrusion rather than novel exploits. For anyone whose email, date of birth, or customer record appears in the dataset, the immediate risk is highly targeted phishing and account-takeover attempts that reference genuine Holland America booking details.

Check
If your organization has ever done corporate bookings, incentive travel, or employee perks through Holland America, Princess, or other Carnival brands, notify affected staff today and watch for cruise-themed phishing referencing genuine loyalty-program details over the coming weeks.
Affected
Anyone who has a Mariner Society loyalty account with Holland America Line, and by extension anyone who has booked a Holland America cruise through loyalty channels. The exposed fields (name, date of birth, email, gender, loyalty status) are foundational identity data - strong enough to power convincing impersonation, knowledge-based authentication bypass, and targeted spear-phishing.
Fix
Check Have I Been Pwned to confirm whether your address is in the Carnival dataset. If it is, watch for phishing emails pretending to be from Holland America or other Carnival brands that reference your real past bookings or loyalty tier - treat any such message as hostile and navigate to the Holland America site directly rather than clicking links. Rotate passwords on any account that shares a password with Mariner Society. At an organizational level, add 'holland-america.com' and 'hollandamericafund.com' lookalike domains to your DMARC and brand-monitoring watchlists, and brief travel-desk staff that any Mariner Society outreach should be verified by phone.

Lovable 'vibe coding' platform exposed source code, Supabase credentials, and AI chat history for 76 days via missing ownership check in API

Security researcher @weezerOSINT disclosed on April 20 that Lovable, the Swedish AI code-generation platform that just raised a $330M Series B at a $6.6B valuation, had a Broken Object Level Authorization flaw letting any free account read another user's project source code, hardcoded database credentials, AI chat transcripts, and customer data - using only five API calls. The /projects/{id}/* endpoints verified Firebase authentication but skipped any ownership check. On April 23 Lovable published a formal incident report admitting the exposure window ran February 3 to April 20, a full 76 days, caused by a backend regression that silently undid a fix shipped in 2025. Every Lovable project created before November 2025 was readable. The researcher demonstrated the impact by pulling source code from Connected Women in AI, a Danish nonprofit with over 3,700 edits in 2026 alone, extracting hardcoded Supabase credentials from that code, then querying the live database to retrieve real names, LinkedIn profiles, and Stripe customer IDs belonging to Accenture Denmark and Copenhagen Business School staff. Lovable's initial public response was to deny a breach occurred and blame its documentation and HackerOne triage partner before eventually apologizing.

Check
If your team or any staff member has ever built anything on Lovable (including experimental internal tools, prototypes, and hackathon projects) treat every secret that was ever in a Lovable project or chat as potentially public.
Affected
Any Lovable project created before November 2025 was readable by any other Lovable user between February 3 and April 20, 2026. That includes source code (which Lovable commonly generates with hardcoded Supabase anon keys and service role keys), AI chat histories (which often contain pasted API keys and config values), and any customer data stored in the project's connected Supabase database.
Fix
Rotate every Supabase anon key and service role key associated with any project you ever built on Lovable, plus any third-party API key that was ever pasted into a Lovable app, chat, or prompt - Stripe, Resend, SendGrid, OpenAI, Anthropic, and so on. Enable Row Level Security on every table in every connected Supabase project and review each policy by hand. Pull the last 90 days of Supabase audit logs and search for anomalous reads. Export and archive anything you need out of Lovable, remove sensitive values from chat history, and watch for Lovable's direct email notifying affected projects. For EU personal data, open the GDPR breach notification process.

Vercel expands Context.ai breach scope - additional accounts compromised, and some predate the April incident entirely

Vercel updated its security bulletin on April 23 to disclose that ongoing forensics has uncovered additional customer accounts compromised in the Context.ai-linked breach that went public on April 19, and - more worryingly - a separate cluster of customer accounts with evidence of compromise that predates and appears unconnected to the Context.ai incident. CEO Guillermo Rauch confirmed on X that the threat actor has been active beyond Context.ai's compromise. Hudson Rock's forensic report traced patient-zero to a Context.ai employee whose laptop was infected by Lumma Stealer in February 2026 after downloading Roblox auto-farm scripts - a roughly four-week dwell time before the operator pivoted into Context.ai's AWS environment and then through OAuth tokens into Vercel's Google Workspace. The stolen credential set from that single laptop included Google Workspace logins, Supabase keys, Datadog tokens, Authkit credentials, and the support@context.ai account. Vercel has now confirmed non-sensitive environment variables in affected team scopes were readable to the attacker, and says customer notifications are going out individually rather than via a public list.

Check
If you run any service on Vercel, re-check your team's incident email for new direct notifications, and proactively rotate any environment variable not marked as 'sensitive' that was stored in Vercel during February to April 2026.
Affected
Vercel customer teams where a member authorized Context.ai's AI Office Suite OAuth integration against a Vercel enterprise Google Workspace account, and any Vercel team with environment variables not explicitly marked as 'sensitive' stored during the February to April 2026 window. The newly-surfaced predate-April account cluster is separate and Vercel has not publicly scoped it - if you receive a notification email, treat it as a distinct compromise and not simply a continuation of the Context.ai incident.
Fix
Rotate every environment variable stored in Vercel that was not marked as 'sensitive' - in practice, treat every database URL, API key, signing secret, and third-party credential as public and rotate it in place. Audit Google Workspace OAuth app grants and revoke any Context.ai 'AI Office Suite' integration. Review Vercel activity logs back to February 2026 for unexpected access to environment variable dashboards. Rotate Supabase, Datadog, and Authkit credentials if any Context.ai employee or integration ever had access to yours. Set a standing policy that no OAuth grant from an external AI tool gets 'Allow All' Workspace permissions.

Dutch cosmetics giant Rituals discloses 'My Rituals' membership database breach

Rituals, the Amsterdam-headquartered cosmetics and home fragrance retailer with roughly 1,000 stores across Europe, the Middle East, and North America, disclosed on April 23 that attackers stole personal information from its 'My Rituals' membership database. The company has not yet said how many members were affected, only that 'personal information' was exfiltrated. No payment card data is reported to have been compromised. Rituals' membership program collects name, email, postal address, and purchase history to drive a loyalty and personalization program, so the exposed fields are ideal material for branded-lookalike phishing and physical-mail fraud referencing real past purchases. The company says it has informed Dutch data protection regulator Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens and is working with an external incident response firm. Rituals did not attribute the breach to a named group and has not described the initial access vector; the disclosure follows a wider April 2026 pattern in which loyalty and membership databases are repeatedly showing up as soft targets for extortion actors looking for PII-heavy datasets.

Check
If your staff or customers subscribe to Rituals memberships (especially in Europe where store density is highest) brief them that loyalty-themed phishing is likely to follow and add rituals.com lookalike domains to your brand monitoring watchlist.
Affected
Anyone with a 'My Rituals' loyalty membership. Businesses that have ever used Rituals for corporate gifting and stored staff contact details in the member account. Organizations with marketing-driven email collection at Rituals store counters for staff-appreciation programs.
Fix
Monitor phishing tags for any message claiming to be from Rituals or a Rituals partner. If your organization collected staff contact details through a Rituals-branded corporate gifting campaign, notify those staff proactively. Add rituals-[typo].com lookalikes to DMARC reporting and to your brand-monitoring ruleset. Rotate any password that was reused between a My Rituals account and another service. For European users, watch for follow-up notifications from Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens once the breach scope is confirmed, and keep the 90-day GDPR clock in mind for your own records of any shared data.

Citizens Bank and Frost Bank breached via third-party vendor - Everest ransomware claims 3.4M and 250K records, deadline expires today

The Everest ransomware group listed Citizens Financial Group and Frost Bank on its leak site on April 20 with a six-day deadline that expires today. Everest claims 3.4 million Citizens records (names, addresses, account numbers) and 250,000 Frost records with the more sensitive set: SSNs, tax IDs, mortgage rates, and income data. Both banks confirmed the breach traces to a third-party vendor - a statement-printing provider for Citizens, a tax-document fulfillment firm for Frost - rather than direct compromise. Citizens disclosed publicly April 21; class-action lawsuits were filed April 23.

Check
If you bank with Citizens or Frost, monitor accounts and credit reports closely, and treat any inbound communication referencing real account or mortgage details as hostile.
Affected
Citizens Financial Group customers (3.4M records claimed; addresses, names, account numbers in samples) and Frost Bank customers (~250K records; samples include SSNs, tax IDs, mortgage rates - high identity-theft risk). Any organization that shares customer PII with statement-printing, tax-document, or marketing-mail vendors faces equivalent third-party exposure.
Fix
Affected consumers: place a credit freeze, enable 2FA on banking apps, and watch for tax and mortgage fraud since the leak window straddles US filing deadlines. Organizations: pull your vendor PII inventory, identify which downstream printers and tax processors hold equivalent record types, and renegotiate contracts to mandate at-rest encryption and breach notification SLAs.

Vercel breach root cause revealed: Lumma Stealer on a Context.ai employee's laptop, delivered via Roblox auto-farm scripts

Follow-up: this is the origin-story update to the Vercel breach disclosed April 19 (which our publication did not cover at the time). Hudson Rock traced the initial compromise to a Context.ai employee whose laptop was infected by Lumma Stealer malware in February 2026 after the user downloaded Roblox 'auto-farm' scripts and game-exploit executors - a notorious delivery vector for infostealers. The malware harvested that employee's Google Workspace credentials plus access keys and logins for Supabase, Datadog, and Authkit. The haul also included the support@context.ai account, letting the attacker escalate inside Context.ai, reach its AWS environment, and then pivot through compromised Google Workspace OAuth tokens into a Vercel employee's enterprise workspace that had granted the 'AI Office Suite' app 'Allow All' permissions. The attacker (ShinyHunters, now selling the data for $2M on BreachForums) read Vercel environment variables not flagged as 'sensitive.' Google pulled the Context.ai Chrome extension (ID omddlmnhcofjbnbflmjginpjjblphbgk) on March 27 - it embedded an OAuth grant for read access to users' entire Google Drive. The lesson is brutal: one employee's personal risky behavior on a work device cascaded through four SaaS platforms into a supply-chain breach that a threat actor is now auctioning.

Check
If any employee at your company has ever signed into Context.ai with a corporate Google Workspace account, treat that account as compromised and begin full credential rotation and OAuth review immediately.
Affected
Any Google Workspace tenant where an employee granted the Context.ai 'AI Office Suite' OAuth app broad permissions (specifically OAuth app IDs 110671459871-30f1spbu0hptbs60cb4vsmv79i7bbvqj.apps.googleusercontent.com and 110671459871-f3cq3okebd3jcg1lllmroqejdbka8cqq.apps.googleusercontent.com). Any Vercel customer whose environment variables were not explicitly marked 'sensitive'. Any organisation whose employees also install uncurated browser extensions or run game cheats on corporate devices (a pattern that keeps reappearing in infostealer cases).
Fix
In Google Workspace admin, search the OAuth app inventory for the two Context.ai client IDs above and revoke them from every user. On Vercel, audit and rotate every environment variable not marked 'sensitive' across every project, and going forward default-enable sensitive flags on new environment variables. Rotate Supabase, Datadog, and Authkit tokens that were ever accessible from a Context.ai-linked Google account. Pull 60 days of audit logs for each affected SaaS and look for impossible-travel sign-ins, new OAuth grants, and unexpected API-key creation. Block game-cheat and executor download domains at the corporate DNS layer and communicate the Roblox-script risk directly to staff.