Last updated: September 29, 2026 at 8:42 AM UTC
All 891 Vulnerability 357 Breach 144 Threat 383 Defense 7
Tag: data-exposure (5 articles)Clear

Over 16,000 misconfigured Supabase databases expose personal data passwords and auth tokens

UpGuard found more than 16,000 misconfigured Supabase databases exposing readable tables with personally identifiable information, passwords, or authentication tokens, with a very small subset appearing to include credit card data. Supabase is an open-source PostgreSQL development platform, popular with developers using AI tools, which now account for more than 60 percent of newly created databases. UpGuard analyzed about 300,000 domains showing Supabase use and inferred exposed data types from table schemas. More than half of the exposed databases held PII, with a smaller subset exposing passwords and tokens. One US valet service alone exposed over 100,000 customer records, showing how missing access controls turn convenient backends into open data stores.

Check
Audit Supabase projects for tables readable without authentication, enable row-level security and proper policies, and rotate any exposed tokens or passwords.
Affected
Supabase projects deployed without row-level security or access policies expose their tables, leaking PII, credentials, and auth tokens to anyone who queries them.
Fix
Turn on row-level security, restrict anonymous access, review AI-generated backends for missing controls, and monitor for unauthorized table reads.

Exposed airline passenger database leaked 220 million records with passport data

Researchers found an exposed database holding more than 220 million airline passenger and crew records, including passport numbers and full flight itineraries, left reachable online. The data came from an Advance Passenger Information System, the kind airlines use to send traveler identity and passport details to border authorities, and it covered anyone who flew to, from, or through Vietnam between 2017 and 2026. Exposed fields included names, dates of birth, nationalities, passport numbers with issuing countries, and flight, seat, and baggage details. Researchers reached it by chaining misconfigurations and default credentials, and it was later secured, though whether the data was copied first is unknown because no access logs existed.

Check
Travelers who flew through the region should watch for identity theft and travel-themed phishing using real passport or itinerary details, and organizations holding traveler data should audit exposed databases and default credentials.
Affected
More than 220 million passenger and crew records with passport numbers, birth dates, nationalities, and flight itineraries were exposed; the data enables identity theft, document fraud, targeted phishing, and surveillance of travelers.
Fix
For organizations, inventory internet-facing databases, remove default credentials, require authentication and encryption on data stores, and enable access logging; aggregators of passport and travel data should treat exposure as high-impact risk.

Vatican prayer app left personal data of 700,000 users exposed

Researchers found that an official Vatican prayer app exposed the personal information of more than 700,000 users worldwide through an insecure configuration. The exposed data included details that can identify individuals and tie them to their use of the app. Faith and health apps are sensitive because the mere fact of using them can be revealing, and religious affiliation is a protected category in many jurisdictions, so even a modest data set carries outsized risk for the people in it. The exposure stemmed from the way the app's backend was set up rather than a sophisticated intrusion, a recurring pattern in mobile app data leaks where access controls are misconfigured.

Check
App developers should review backend access controls and confirm that user data stores require authentication and are not readable by anyone who can reach the endpoint.
Affected
More than 700,000 users of the Vatican prayer app whose personal information was exposed; because the data links people to a religious app, it is sensitive even where individual fields seem limited.
Fix
Developers should enforce authentication on all data endpoints, apply least privilege to backend stores, test for misconfiguration before release, and minimize the personal data collected by faith and health apps.

Fake 'UK Visa Portal' third-party (Active Leadgen LLC) exposed 100,000 passports and selfies on public AWS S3

TechCrunch has flagged a public AWS S3 bucket operated by a UAE-registered third-party site, UK Visa Portal (Active Leadgen LLC), that exposed at least 100,000 passport scans and selfies belonging to people who paid extra to apply for UK electronic travel authorizations. The site is not the official GOV.UK service; users could complete the same application directly on GOV.UK in minutes for free. The third party reportedly responded with legal threats instead of remediation. The dataset is now in the wild and creates substantial identity-document compromise risk - passport scans plus selfies enable KYC bypass against banks, exchanges, and government services.

Check
Brief staff that 'UK Visa Portal' and similar third-party visa-help sites are not GOV.UK and may leak documents. Anyone who uploaded a passport to ukvisaportal.com should treat it as compromised.
Affected
100,000+ individuals (and counting) who used Active Leadgen LLC's UK Visa Portal site. Passport scans plus selfies enable KYC bypass against banks, exchanges, and government services.
Fix
Affected individuals: report passport as potentially compromised; consider replacement. Banks/exchanges: tighten document-plus-liveness verification against AI-generated impersonations using leaked identity documents.

Lovable 'vibe coding' platform exposed source code, Supabase credentials, and AI chat history for 76 days via missing ownership check in API

Security researcher @weezerOSINT disclosed on April 20 that Lovable, the Swedish AI code-generation platform that just raised a $330M Series B at a $6.6B valuation, had a Broken Object Level Authorization flaw letting any free account read another user's project source code, hardcoded database credentials, AI chat transcripts, and customer data - using only five API calls. The /projects/{id}/* endpoints verified Firebase authentication but skipped any ownership check. On April 23 Lovable published a formal incident report admitting the exposure window ran February 3 to April 20, a full 76 days, caused by a backend regression that silently undid a fix shipped in 2025. Every Lovable project created before November 2025 was readable. The researcher demonstrated the impact by pulling source code from Connected Women in AI, a Danish nonprofit with over 3,700 edits in 2026 alone, extracting hardcoded Supabase credentials from that code, then querying the live database to retrieve real names, LinkedIn profiles, and Stripe customer IDs belonging to Accenture Denmark and Copenhagen Business School staff. Lovable's initial public response was to deny a breach occurred and blame its documentation and HackerOne triage partner before eventually apologizing.

Check
If your team or any staff member has ever built anything on Lovable (including experimental internal tools, prototypes, and hackathon projects) treat every secret that was ever in a Lovable project or chat as potentially public.
Affected
Any Lovable project created before November 2025 was readable by any other Lovable user between February 3 and April 20, 2026. That includes source code (which Lovable commonly generates with hardcoded Supabase anon keys and service role keys), AI chat histories (which often contain pasted API keys and config values), and any customer data stored in the project's connected Supabase database.
Fix
Rotate every Supabase anon key and service role key associated with any project you ever built on Lovable, plus any third-party API key that was ever pasted into a Lovable app, chat, or prompt - Stripe, Resend, SendGrid, OpenAI, Anthropic, and so on. Enable Row Level Security on every table in every connected Supabase project and review each policy by hand. Pull the last 90 days of Supabase audit logs and search for anomalous reads. Export and archive anything you need out of Lovable, remove sensitive values from chat history, and watch for Lovable's direct email notifying affected projects. For EU personal data, open the GDPR breach notification process.