Last updated: September 29, 2026 at 8:42 AM UTC
All 891 Vulnerability 357 Breach 144 Threat 383 Defense 7
Tag: azure-ad (2 articles)Clear

Exploited Entra ID flaw scored a perfect ten but was fixed in Microsoft's cloud

Microsoft disclosed that a critical flaw in Entra ID, its cloud identity and access service formerly known as Azure Active Directory, was exploited in the wild, though it says the issue is fully mitigated on its side and customers need take no action. Tracked as CVE-2026-69836 and scored 10.0, it is an unsafe-deserialization bug that let an unauthenticated attacker run code over the network in the identity service. Because Entra ID underpins sign-in to Microsoft 365, Azure, and many third-party apps, a code execution flaw there is unusually serious. Microsoft has not shared how it was exploited, so the practical step is reviewing identity logs for suspicious activity before the disclosure.

Check
No patching is required since Microsoft fixed this in its cloud, but review Entra ID sign-in and audit logs for suspicious service-principal changes, role assignments, and unusual token or admin activity.
Affected
Organizations relying on Microsoft Entra ID for identity (CVE-2026-69836); the flaw allowed unauthenticated remote code execution in the identity service itself, though Microsoft states it is now fully mitigated.
Fix
Treat this as a prompt to hunt for identity compromise, not to patch: review privileged accounts, tokens, and app registrations for anomalies, tighten conditional access, and monitor Entra logs.

Microsoft patches Entra ID role flaw that let a low-privileged service account impersonate any service principal in your tenant

Microsoft quietly patched a privilege escalation flaw in Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) that let an attacker with a low-privileged service account take over any service principal in the same tenant - including high-value ones with admin consent grants. The bug was in how Entra ID validated role assignments during certain API calls: the validator checked whether the caller had any role on a service principal but didn't check whether that role authorized the specific action. Microsoft fixed the flaw on the back end, so customers don't need a patch - but the takeover scenario means anyone who exploited it before the fix could have created persistent backdoors via OAuth grants.

Check
Audit your Entra ID tenant this week for unfamiliar service principals, unexpected admin consent grants, and OAuth tokens issued to apps you don't recognize.
Affected
Microsoft Entra ID tenants with multiple service principals where any low-privileged account had role assignments on those service principals. The fix is server-side, so you don't need to apply a patch - but you do need to assume any attacker with foothold access before the fix could have abused this to escalate.
Fix
Run a Microsoft Graph audit on your tenant: list all service principals, OAuth grants, and app role assignments created since January 2026. Investigate any unfamiliar app, any grant from a service account, and any service principal whose roles changed unexpectedly. Revoke and re-issue admin consent for high-privilege apps. Enable audit logging for application registrations.