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Last updated: July 5, 2026 at 9:01 AM UTC
All 557 Vulnerability 199 Breach 106 Threat 245 Defense 7
Tag: oidc (3 articles)Clear
vulnerability
CVE-2026-48558
2026-06-16

SimpleHelp flaw lets unauthenticated attackers create rogue admin technicians

A critical flaw in SimpleHelp, a remote support and management tool used by IT teams and managed service providers, lets an unauthenticated attacker create a privileged technician account and skip multi-factor authentication. The bug (CVE-2026-48558) only affects servers configured to use OpenID Connect (OIDC) single sign-on, including Azure AD, and stems from how the server validates identity assertions from the login provider. A rogue technician can then remote into managed machines and run scripts, giving attackers a foothold across every connected endpoint. Researchers found roughly 14,000 SimpleHelp servers exposed online, with about 7 percent using the vulnerable OIDC setup. The flaw affects versions 5.5.15 and earlier.

simplehelprmmauth-bypassoidc
Check
Determine whether your SimpleHelp servers use OIDC single sign-on (generic or Azure AD) and are running 5.5.15 or earlier, then review the technician account list for unfamiliar or recently created accounts.
Affected
SimpleHelp servers version 5.5.15 and earlier and 6.0 pre-release builds configured for OpenID Connect authentication (CVE-2026-48558), especially those exposed to the internet with group-authenticated logins allowed.
Fix
Update SimpleHelp to the latest patched release immediately. Until then, restrict server access to trusted networks and remove any unrecognized technician accounts found during review.
vulnerability
2026-06-05

Claude Code GitHub Action flaw let one malicious issue hijack repos via prompt injection and OIDC token theft - bot-trigger bypass

Researcher RyotaK has disclosed a now-patched flaw in Anthropic's Claude Code GitHub Action, which drops Claude into CI/CD to triage issues and review PRs with broad repo permissions. The action's trigger check waved through any actor whose name ended in [bot] - but anyone can register a GitHub App and use its token to open an issue on a public repo. Agent mode lacked the human-actor check tag mode had. The attacker then used indirect prompt injection in an issue to make Claude read /proc/self/environ and write back the OIDC credentials, which can be replayed for an installation token with write access. Anthropic's example workflow shipped with allowed_non_write_users: '*'.

claude-codegithub-actionsprompt-injectionoidcci-cd
Check
Audit repos using Claude Code GitHub Action: update to the patched version, and check workflows for allowed_non_write_users set to '*'. Review public run summaries for leaked secrets.
Affected
Repositories using vulnerable Claude Code GitHub Action versions, especially in agent mode or with allowed_non_write_users: '*' copied from Anthropic's example. Public repos are exposed to [bot]-triggered prompt-injection attacks.
Fix
Update the Claude Code action to the fixed release. Remove allowed_non_write_users: '*', restrict triggers to write-access humans, and rotate any OIDC-derived tokens. Avoid posting task output to public run summaries.
threat
2026-05-24

GitHub ships npm 11.15.0 with 2FA-gated staging, OIDC trusted publishing, and per-source install flags in response to TeamPCP wave

GitHub has shipped npm CLI 11.15.0 introducing a 'staging' workflow that lets maintainers run 'npm stage publish' to push a candidate to a staging area before going live - with the constraint that the package must already exist on the registry and have 2FA enabled on the account. Three new install flags (--allow-file, --allow-remote, --allow-directory) extend the existing --allow-git to give developers an explicit allowlist for every non-registry install source. GitHub is also encouraging maintainers to pair staging with trusted publishing via OIDC. The changes respond to the TeamPCP supply-chain wave that compromised hundreds of packages over the past several weeks.

npmgithubsupply-chain2faoidc
Check
Inventory developer machines using npm CLI. Upgrade to 11.15.0+ to access the staging workflow. Identify high-impact packages your team publishes and require 2FA on those maintainer accounts.
Affected
Any npm publisher whose tokens or maintainer accounts could be hijacked. The TeamPCP wave hit 600+ packages in one hour on May 19 by abusing maintainer accounts.
Fix
Adopt 'npm stage publish' for production packages. Enable 2FA on all maintainer accounts. Configure trusted publishing via OIDC where supported. Apply --allow-file / --allow-remote / --allow-directory selectively in CI.