A critical vulnerability in the Ninja Forms File Uploads premium add-on for WordPress allows attackers to upload arbitrary files - including PHP web shells - without any authentication. Over 800,000 WordPress sites use Ninja Forms, and the File Uploads extension is one of its most popular premium add-ons. Successful exploitation gives an attacker full code execution on the web server. No user interaction required - just a crafted request to the file upload endpoint.
A high-severity Docker Engine flaw allows attackers to bypass authorization plugins with a single oversized HTTP request. CVE-2026-34040 (CVSS 8.8) stems from an incomplete fix for CVE-2024-41110 from July 2024 - the original patch missed requests over 1MB, which get forwarded to the Docker daemon without their body, so the AuthZ plugin sees nothing to block while the daemon processes the full malicious payload. The result: a privileged container with root access to the host filesystem, exposing AWS credentials, SSH keys, Kubernetes configs, and everything else on the machine. Critically, Cyera researchers demonstrated that AI coding agents running inside Docker sandboxes can be tricked via prompt injection into crafting the bypass request themselves - no human attacker needed.
ShinyHunters breached Anodot, an AI-based data anomaly detection platform acquired by Glassbox in late 2025, and stole authentication tokens that connected Anodot to its customers' cloud environments. Using those tokens, the attackers accessed Snowflake data warehouses belonging to over a dozen companies and began exfiltrating data last Friday - timed to the Easter/Passover holiday for maximum dwell time. ShinyHunters also attempted to use the stolen tokens against Salesforce instances but were blocked by AI detection. The group is now extorting affected companies, demanding ransom payments to prevent data release. Anodot's customer list includes Puma, SAP, T-Mobile, and UPS. This is the same playbook ShinyHunters used in the 2025 Snowflake campaign and the Gainsight/Salesforce attacks - breach a trusted integration, not the platform itself.
A joint FBI/CISA advisory warns that Iranian-affiliated APT actors are actively targeting internet-exposed Rockwell Automation and Allen-Bradley programmable logic controllers across US critical infrastructure - specifically Government Services, Water and Wastewater Systems, and Energy sectors. The attacks have caused financial losses and operational disruptions since March 2026, with the FBI confirming attackers extracted PLC project files and manipulated data displayed on HMI and SCADA systems. The escalation is linked to ongoing hostilities between Iran, the US, and Israel.
A frustrated security researcher published working exploit code for an unpatched Windows local privilege escalation flaw after Microsoft's Security Response Center mishandled the disclosure. The researcher, posting as Chaotic Eclipse, dropped the proof-of-concept on GitHub on April 3 with the message "I was not bluffing Microsoft." Will Dormann of Tharsos confirmed the exploit works - it combines a TOCTOU race condition with path confusion to access the SAM database containing local account password hashes, enabling escalation to SYSTEM privileges. The exploit is confirmed working on Windows desktop but unreliable on Windows Server. The researcher deliberately included bugs in the PoC, but the underlying technique is now public and weaponizable.
Microsoft Threat Intelligence published a detailed report on Storm-1175, a China-based financially motivated group that deploys Medusa ransomware at extreme speed - sometimes moving from initial access to full ransomware deployment within 24 hours. The group exploits internet-facing systems using a mix of zero-day and recently disclosed (n-day) vulnerabilities, having weaponized over 16 flaws across 10 products since 2023. Two vulnerabilities were exploited as zero-days a full week before public disclosure. Recent targets include healthcare, education, finance, and professional services organizations in the US, UK, and Australia. Their playbook: exploit a web-facing flaw, create persistence via new accounts and web shells, steal credentials with Mimikatz, disable Defender via registry modifications, exfiltrate data with Rclone, then deploy Medusa across the network.
If you patched FortiClient EMS for CVE-2026-21643 two weeks ago by upgrading to 7.4.5, you're now vulnerable to a new zero-day. CVE-2026-35616 is a CVSS 9.1 pre-authentication API access bypass affecting versions 7.4.5 and 7.4.6 - the exact versions customers upgraded to. Defused Cyber spotted exploitation in the wild starting March 31. Fortinet released an emergency weekend hotfix on Saturday, with watchTowr noting attackers deliberately timed this for the Easter holiday when security teams are at half strength.
Cisco Talos uncovered a large-scale automated campaign by threat cluster UAT-10608 that exploits React2Shell - a CVSS 10.0 pre-auth RCE flaw in React Server Components used by Next.js. One crafted HTTP request is all it takes to get code execution, no credentials needed. The attackers scan with Shodan and Censys, breach Next.js apps, then deploy the NEXUS Listener framework to harvest database credentials, SSH keys, AWS tokens, Stripe API keys, Kubernetes secrets, and GitHub tokens at scale. At least 766 hosts across multiple cloud providers were compromised within 24 hours.
The Axios supply chain attack we covered on March 31 has now been attributed to UNC1069, a North Korean threat group linked to BlueNoroff that specializes in financially motivated attacks against crypto exchanges and financial institutions. Google's Mandiant confirmed the attackers social-engineered the lead maintainer through a fake video call, deploying a RAT via the compromised npm account. Socket warns this wasn't a one-off - the same actors have compromised accounts spanning some of the most widely depended-upon packages in the npm registry.
The European Commission cloud hack we first reported on March 29 is far worse than initially disclosed. CERT-EU now confirms TeamPCP used an AWS API key stolen through the Trivy supply chain attack to breach the Commission's Amazon cloud environment on March 10 - five days before anyone noticed. The stolen data includes personal information, usernames, and 52,000 email files across 71 hosted clients: 42 internal Commission departments and at least 29 other EU entities. ShinyHunters published the full 340GB dataset on their leak site.
TrustStrike Labs