Last updated: November 2, 2026 at 1:20 PM UTC
All 957 Vulnerability 399 Breach 144 Threat 407 Defense 7
Tag: provenance (2 articles)Clear

npm Trusted Publishing slug-reuse flaw exposed over 1,500 packages to unauthorized takeover

Bloom Security disclosed a flaw in npm's Trusted Publishing, which binds a package to a GitHub repository and workflow. npm recorded the binding by repository slug rather than GitHub's permanent numeric IDs, so once a bound repository or owner was renamed, transferred, or deleted, an attacker could claim the freed slug, add a matching workflow, and receive a publish credential, even forging a valid provenance attestation. Bloom counted more than 1,500 exposed packages with over 10 million total downloads. GitHub, notified in June through HackerOne, shipped a fix in October so unvalidated configurations expire after 48 hours. It is unknown whether anyone exploited the weakness in the wild.

Check
Run npm trust list to confirm each bound repository still belongs to you, rebind any pointing to renamed or transferred repositories, and remove bindings before deleting a repository.
Affected
npm packages bound through Trusted Publishing to a repository or owner that was later renamed, transferred, or deleted could be hijacked by an attacker claiming the freed slug.
Fix
Verify and rebind Trusted Publishing configurations, check that package provenance attestations name the expected repository, and apply the same review to GitLab-based Trusted Publishing.

AsyncAPI npm packages backdoored through a hijacked build pipeline

Attackers backdoored several widely used @asyncapi npm packages, together drawing around three million weekly downloads, by hijacking the project's GitHub Actions build pipeline rather than stealing a maintainer's npm token. Because the project's own release workflow published the malicious versions, they carried valid provenance signatures, which prove where a package came from but not that the code was trustworthy. The payload was hidden in normal runtime files behind trailing whitespace and ran when the module was imported, not on install, so defenses aimed at install scripts missed it. Once loaded, it fetched an encrypted second stage, stole credentials and cloud and registry tokens, and planted persistence, even in developer tool configuration files.

Check
Check whether your projects or CI pulled the affected @asyncapi versions, focusing on systems that imported the modules, not only installed them, and review developer and build environments for stolen tokens.
Affected
Developers and CI pipelines that imported the compromised @asyncapi versions; the malware steals credentials, cloud keys, and npm and GitHub tokens and adds persistence, and valid provenance signatures made them look trustworthy.
Fix
Downgrade to the clean @asyncapi versions, remove the bad ones from lockfiles, caches, and mirrors, rotate credentials reachable from affected machines from a clean system, and harden CI against untrusted pull-request triggers.