Last updated: August 19, 2026 at 1:47 AM UTC
All 741 Vulnerability 286 Breach 129 Threat 319 Defense 7
Tag: shinyhunters (46 articles)Clear

Carnival confirms 7.5 million Holland America Mariner Society loyalty records leaked after ShinyHunters refused extortion deadline

Carnival Corporation has been confirmed as a ShinyHunters breach victim, and the data is now public. Have I Been Pwned added the breach on April 23 with 7,531,359 unique email addresses drawn from 8.7 million records. The data comes from the Mariner Society loyalty program operated by Holland America Line, one of Carnival's cruise brands, and contains full names, dates of birth, genders, email addresses, and loyalty program status fields. ShinyHunters initially listed Carnival on its 'pay or leak' portal on April 18 with an April 21 deadline alongside Zara, 7-Eleven, and roughly 40 other organizations. When Carnival did not pay, the group published the dataset on its leak site this week. Carnival confirmed to reporters that the initial access came from a phishing compromise of a single employee account - a reminder that ShinyHunters continues to rely on human-layer intrusion rather than novel exploits. For anyone whose email, date of birth, or customer record appears in the dataset, the immediate risk is highly targeted phishing and account-takeover attempts that reference genuine Holland America booking details.

Check
If your organization has ever done corporate bookings, incentive travel, or employee perks through Holland America, Princess, or other Carnival brands, notify affected staff today and watch for cruise-themed phishing referencing genuine loyalty-program details over the coming weeks.
Affected
Anyone who has a Mariner Society loyalty account with Holland America Line, and by extension anyone who has booked a Holland America cruise through loyalty channels. The exposed fields (name, date of birth, email, gender, loyalty status) are foundational identity data - strong enough to power convincing impersonation, knowledge-based authentication bypass, and targeted spear-phishing.
Fix
Check Have I Been Pwned to confirm whether your address is in the Carnival dataset. If it is, watch for phishing emails pretending to be from Holland America or other Carnival brands that reference your real past bookings or loyalty tier - treat any such message as hostile and navigate to the Holland America site directly rather than clicking links. Rotate passwords on any account that shares a password with Mariner Society. At an organizational level, add 'holland-america.com' and 'hollandamericafund.com' lookalike domains to your DMARC and brand-monitoring watchlists, and brief travel-desk staff that any Mariner Society outreach should be verified by phone.

Vercel breach root cause revealed: Lumma Stealer on a Context.ai employee's laptop, delivered via Roblox auto-farm scripts

Follow-up: this is the origin-story update to the Vercel breach disclosed April 19 (which our publication did not cover at the time). Hudson Rock traced the initial compromise to a Context.ai employee whose laptop was infected by Lumma Stealer malware in February 2026 after the user downloaded Roblox 'auto-farm' scripts and game-exploit executors - a notorious delivery vector for infostealers. The malware harvested that employee's Google Workspace credentials plus access keys and logins for Supabase, Datadog, and Authkit. The haul also included the support@context.ai account, letting the attacker escalate inside Context.ai, reach its AWS environment, and then pivot through compromised Google Workspace OAuth tokens into a Vercel employee's enterprise workspace that had granted the 'AI Office Suite' app 'Allow All' permissions. The attacker (ShinyHunters, now selling the data for $2M on BreachForums) read Vercel environment variables not flagged as 'sensitive.' Google pulled the Context.ai Chrome extension (ID omddlmnhcofjbnbflmjginpjjblphbgk) on March 27 - it embedded an OAuth grant for read access to users' entire Google Drive. The lesson is brutal: one employee's personal risky behavior on a work device cascaded through four SaaS platforms into a supply-chain breach that a threat actor is now auctioning.

Check
If any employee at your company has ever signed into Context.ai with a corporate Google Workspace account, treat that account as compromised and begin full credential rotation and OAuth review immediately.
Affected
Any Google Workspace tenant where an employee granted the Context.ai 'AI Office Suite' OAuth app broad permissions (specifically OAuth app IDs 110671459871-30f1spbu0hptbs60cb4vsmv79i7bbvqj.apps.googleusercontent.com and 110671459871-f3cq3okebd3jcg1lllmroqejdbka8cqq.apps.googleusercontent.com). Any Vercel customer whose environment variables were not explicitly marked 'sensitive'. Any organisation whose employees also install uncurated browser extensions or run game cheats on corporate devices (a pattern that keeps reappearing in infostealer cases).
Fix
In Google Workspace admin, search the OAuth app inventory for the two Context.ai client IDs above and revoke them from every user. On Vercel, audit and rotate every environment variable not marked 'sensitive' across every project, and going forward default-enable sensitive flags on new environment variables. Rotate Supabase, Datadog, and Authkit tokens that were ever accessible from a Context.ai-linked Google account. Pull 60 days of audit logs for each affected SaaS and look for impossible-travel sign-ins, new OAuth grants, and unexpected API-key creation. Block game-cheat and executor download domains at the corporate DNS layer and communicate the Roblox-script risk directly to staff.

Vercel confirms breach - attackers got in through Context.ai AI tool's Google Workspace OAuth, stole customer environment variables

Cloud development platform Vercel disclosed a security incident on April 19 after a threat actor claiming to be ShinyHunters posted stolen data for sale on a hacking forum. Vercel CEO Guillermo Rauch confirmed the initial access came through a breach at Context.ai, an enterprise AI platform one Vercel employee had signed up for using their Vercel enterprise account with 'Allow All' OAuth permissions. Attackers compromised Context.ai, stole the OAuth token, took over the employee's Google Workspace account, and pivoted into Vercel environments. Once inside, they accessed environment variables not marked as 'sensitive' - these are stored unencrypted at rest, unlike sensitive env vars which Vercel encrypts. The attacker posted 580 employee records (names, emails, account status, activity timestamps) as a teaser, plus screenshots of an internal Vercel Enterprise dashboard. They claim to also have access keys, source code, database data, and API keys, though Vercel characterizes impact as a 'limited subset' of customers. Mandiant is engaged. This is the cleanest real-world example to date of the AI supply chain risk pattern everyone has been warning about: a third-party AI tool with broad OAuth scopes becomes the initial access vector into your primary infrastructure.

Check
If you deploy apps on Vercel, rotate all environment variables immediately - especially any not marked 'sensitive'. Also audit every third-party AI/SaaS tool that has OAuth access to your Google Workspace or similar identity provider.
Affected
Any Vercel customer with environment variables not marked 'sensitive'. Vercel has directly contacted a 'limited subset' of customers whose credentials were compromised. If you weren't contacted, Vercel says it has no evidence of your data being accessed at this time. Separately: any organization using Context.ai with Google Workspace OAuth granted 'Allow All' permissions.
Fix
Rotate every Vercel environment variable and redeploy applications to pick up the new values. Mark any secret as 'sensitive' in Vercel's dashboard going forward - this encrypts at rest. In Google Workspace Admin, search for and revoke OAuth App ID 110671459871-30f1spbu0hptbs60cb4vsmv79i7bbvqj.apps.googleusercontent.com. Review Google Workspace audit logs between April 1-19 for unusual OAuth grants or token access. Audit every third-party tool connected to your Google Workspace - specifically those granted broad OAuth scopes - and remove any your team isn't actively using.

ShinyHunters breach SaaS integrator Anodot, steal auth tokens to raid Snowflake customers - 12+ companies hit

ShinyHunters breached Anodot, an AI-based data anomaly detection platform acquired by Glassbox in late 2025, and stole authentication tokens that connected Anodot to its customers' cloud environments. Using those tokens, the attackers accessed Snowflake data warehouses belonging to over a dozen companies and began exfiltrating data last Friday - timed to the Easter/Passover holiday for maximum dwell time. ShinyHunters also attempted to use the stolen tokens against Salesforce instances but were blocked by AI detection. The group is now extorting affected companies, demanding ransom payments to prevent data release. Anodot's customer list includes Puma, SAP, T-Mobile, and UPS. This is the same playbook ShinyHunters used in the 2025 Snowflake campaign and the Gainsight/Salesforce attacks - breach a trusted integration, not the platform itself.

Check
Audit every third-party SaaS integration connected to your Snowflake, Salesforce, or other cloud data platforms. Identify which ones hold active authentication tokens with read access to your data.
Affected
Any organization using Anodot (now Glassbox) integrations connected to Snowflake, Salesforce, S3, or Amazon Kinesis. Broader risk: any company with SaaS-to-SaaS integrations that use long-lived OAuth tokens or API keys.
Fix
Revoke and rotate all authentication tokens for Anodot/Glassbox integrations immediately. Review Snowflake query logs for unusual data access patterns since late March. Enable network policies to restrict Snowflake access by IP. Audit all third-party integrations for least-privilege access - most SaaS connectors have broader permissions than they need. Monitor for ShinyHunters extortion communications.

CERT-EU confirms TeamPCP breached European Commission via Trivy - 30 EU entities exposed, 340GB leaked

The European Commission cloud hack we first reported on March 29 is far worse than initially disclosed. CERT-EU now confirms TeamPCP used an AWS API key stolen through the Trivy supply chain attack to breach the Commission's Amazon cloud environment on March 10 - five days before anyone noticed. The stolen data includes personal information, usernames, and 52,000 email files across 71 hosted clients: 42 internal Commission departments and at least 29 other EU entities. ShinyHunters published the full 340GB dataset on their leak site.

Check
If your organization interacted with any Europa.eu hosted service, assume your contact data may be in the leaked dataset.
Affected
42 internal European Commission clients and at least 29 other EU entities using the Europa.eu web hosting service. Any organization that exchanged emails with these entities may have data in the leak.
Fix
Monitor for credential exposure from the leaked dataset. If you used Trivy in CI/CD pipelines, rotate all AWS keys and pipeline secrets immediately. Block scan.aquasecurtiy[.]org and 45.148.10.212. Pin Trivy to v0.69.3, trivy-action to v0.35.0, setup-trivy to v0.2.6.

Hims & Hers discloses breach after ShinyHunters steal millions of Zendesk support tickets via Okta SSO

Telehealth giant Hims & Hers - nearly $1 billion in annual revenue, millions of subscribers - disclosed that hackers stole customer support tickets from its Zendesk instance between February 4-7. The ShinyHunters extortion gang conducted the breach by compromising Okta SSO credentials through social engineering, then pivoting into the Zendesk platform. Stolen data includes names, contact information, and details from support requests. No medical records or doctor communications were compromised. The company took two months to disclose.

Check
Review whether your organization uses Zendesk with Okta SSO integration - this same attack pattern has hit multiple companies recently.
Affected
Any organization using Zendesk integrated with Okta SSO for authentication. Hims & Hers, ManoMano, and Crunchyroll were all breached through this pattern.
Fix
Enforce phishing-resistant MFA (FIDO2 hardware keys) on all Okta accounts - standard TOTP/push MFA can be bypassed by social engineering. Audit Okta sign-in logs for SSO sessions accessing Zendesk from unusual locations. Review third-party SaaS integrations connected through your identity provider.