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Last updated: September 29, 2026 at 8:42 AM UTC
All 891 Vulnerability 357 Breach 144 Threat 383 Defense 7
Tag: crates-io (2 articles)Clear
threat
2026-08-21

Poisoned Rust crate ran malware at build time inside a 245-million-download library

Attackers briefly poisoned arrayref, a foundational Rust crate with about 245 million downloads that sits underneath widely used graphics and blockchain libraries, along with two sibling crates from the same maintainer account. The crate code itself was clean; each added a dependency on a typosquat of a popular package whose build script ran during compilation, pulling and executing an infostealer that grabbed host data and browser credentials. Because the malicious code lived in a build script, simply compiling a project that resolved the crate ran it, with nothing from the library needing to be called. The bad versions were pulled within about ninety minutes, but any build during that window was exposed.

rustcrates-iosupply-chainbuild-scriptinfostealer
Check
If you build Rust projects, check whether arrayref, internment, or append-only-vec resolved during the exposure window, search the Cargo cache for the malicious files, and pin arrayref to 0.3.9 or earlier.
Affected
Rust developers and CI systems that resolved the poisoned crate versions during the window; the malicious build script ran an infostealer at compile time, taking host information and browser credentials.
Fix
Build with committed lockfiles and the locked flag to avoid pulling fresh malicious versions, enable two-factor authentication on registry accounts, and treat any machine that built during the window as potentially compromised.
threat
2026-05-26

TrapDoor cross-ecosystem supply chain hits npm, PyPI, Crates.io with 34+ malicious packages; plants .cursorrules and CLAUDE.md to trick AI assistants

Socket has detailed TrapDoor, a coordinated cross-ecosystem supply-chain campaign that has published 34+ malicious packages across 384+ versions on npm, PyPI, and Crates.io since May 22. Targets are crypto, DeFi, Solana, and AI developers. The npm packages deploy trap-core.js, which scans for credentials, validates AWS and GitHub tokens via API, and persists via cron, systemd, Git hooks, shell rcfiles, and SSH; Rust crates use build.rs to trigger; Python packages auto-execute on import to fetch JavaScript from ddjidd564.github[.]io. Notable twist: the campaign also plants .cursorrules and CLAUDE.md in PRs to popular AI repos to trick AI coding assistants into running 'security scans' that exfiltrate secrets.

supply-chainnpmpypicrates-ioai-assistants
Check
Search npm, pip, and cargo install logs across CI/CD and developer machines for any of the 34+ TrapDoor packages. Check repos for unsolicited .cursorrules or CLAUDE.md additions in PRs.
Affected
Crypto, DeFi, Solana, and AI developers who install packages by name without lockfile pinning. Users of AI coding assistants (Cursor, Claude) that read .cursorrules or CLAUDE.md.
Fix
Pin via lockfiles. Block ddjidd564.github[.]io at egress. Audit .cursorrules and CLAUDE.md across repos. Configure AI coding assistants to require explicit confirmation before running arbitrary commands from project files.