7-Zip has released version 26.02 to fix a remote code execution vulnerability that can be triggered when a user opens a specially crafted compressed file. The archiving tool is installed on a very large number of Windows systems and is routinely used to open attachments and downloads, so a flaw that fires on opening an archive is attractive to attackers who rely on phishing. There are no reports of active exploitation so far. Similar archiving tool flaws have been weaponized quickly in the past: a WinRAR vulnerability was used last year by a Russian group in phishing attacks to install malware, so patching early matters.
Security firm Mindgard disclosed an unpatched flaw in Cursor, the widely used AI code editor, that runs code automatically when a developer opens a malicious repository on Windows. When loading a project, Cursor looks for a Git binary in several places, including the workspace itself, so a file named git.exe planted in the repository root gets executed with no click, prompt, or warning, and it re-runs on a cadence while the project stays open. In a proof of concept, a renamed Windows Calculator launched on its own. Mindgard reported it in December and went public after seven months with no fix, so there is no patch and no CVE, only workarounds.
Researchers at Binarly found six flaws in U-Boot, the open-source bootloader inside routers, IoT devices, industrial systems, and the management chips of data-center servers. All six are triggered while U-Boot is still reading an untrusted firmware image, before it verifies the signature, so an attacker who supplies a malicious image can act before the trust check runs. Two of the flaws can lead to arbitrary code execution at boot, undermining the whole chain of trust, while the other four crash the device. The vulnerable code dates back to 2013, affecting many releases and vendor forks. Exploiting them does not always need physical access: a compromised management interface could push a malicious image.
Researchers at Mozilla's 0DIN found that an AI coding agent told to clone and set up a seemingly harmless GitHub repository can be tricked into running malware that stays invisible to security scanners, the agent itself, and human reviewers. The trick is that nothing malicious sits in the repository's files. Instead, a routine-looking setup command runs a script that fetches a value hidden in a DNS TXT record and executes it as a shell command, pulling down and running an attacker's payload like a reverse shell. Because the payload lives outside the repo and arrives over DNS at setup time, code review and static scanning see nothing wrong.