Last updated: August 19, 2026 at 1:47 AM UTC
All 741 Vulnerability 286 Breach 129 Threat 319 Defense 7
Tag: mirai (3 articles)Clear

Evooo1Bot Linux botnet turns internet-facing gateways into traffic relays

A new Mirai-based modular Linux botnet called Evooo1Bot is compromising internet-facing gateway devices and turning them into traffic relay nodes. Once installed, it runs a SOCKS5 proxy on the infected device, letting the operators route their own traffic through the victim's connection to hide the true origin of other activity. Building on the widely reused Mirai code base and a modular design, it targets the kind of routers and gateways that sit exposed at the network edge, often running outdated firmware and weak credentials. Relay botnets like this quietly monetize compromised devices and complicate attribution for whatever traffic passes through them.

Check
Keep internet-facing routers and gateways patched, replace default or weak credentials, disable unnecessary remote management, and watch for unexpected outbound proxy traffic or SOCKS5 services on edge devices.
Affected
Internet-exposed Linux-based routers and gateway devices with weak credentials or outdated firmware; Evooo1Bot enrolls them as SOCKS5 relays, using their connections to anonymize and route other malicious traffic.
Fix
Harden and update edge devices, restrict management interfaces, monitor for proxy and relay behavior and unusual outbound connections, and replace devices that no longer receive firmware support.

Brazilian anti-DDoS firm Huge Networks was running a Mirai botnet that knocked Brazilian ISPs offline for years - either to drum up business or because someone breached their CEO's SSH keys

Brian Krebs published an investigation showing that Huge Networks, a Brazilian DDoS protection firm, has been running the Mirai-based botnet behind a years-long DDoS campaign against other Brazilian ISPs. An exposed open directory revealed Portuguese-language Python attack scripts that relied on the personal SSH keys of Huge Networks CEO Erick Nascimento. The botnet ran on compromised TP-Link Archer AX21 routers and unmanaged DNS servers, attacking Brazilian IP prefixes for 10-60 seconds at a time. Nascimento says a January 2026 intrusion compromised his SSH keys; he denies running the attacks. ISPs say the attacks have been ongoing since December 2024.

Check
If you run a TP-Link Archer AX21 router or any consumer router for business use, factory-reset it and update to the latest firmware - they remain a primary Mirai botnet recruitment target.
Affected
TP-Link Archer AX21 routers and similar consumer-grade equipment remain widely used as Mirai botnet members. Brazilian ISPs are the targets, but Mirai variants are used worldwide. The deeper pattern: DDoS protection firms turning out to be the source of the attacks they bill to mitigate is recurring (Krebs identified the original 2016 Mirai authors as DDoS provider co-owners).
Fix
For TP-Link Archer AX21 owners: factory reset, update firmware, disable WAN-side admin access. Replace if firmware is end-of-life. For organizations evaluating DDoS providers: ask for clear separation between attack telemetry and customer acquisition, request audited proof of how attack traffic is sourced, and consider providers in jurisdictions with stronger anti-fraud regulations.

Mirai botnet exploits a year-old D-Link PoC to build fresh botnets on discontinued routers (CVE-2025-29635)

Akamai's Security Intelligence and Response Team caught a Mirai variant actively exploiting CVE-2025-29635, a command-injection flaw in discontinued D-Link DIR-823X routers, roughly one year after the vulnerability was publicly disclosed and its proof-of-concept exploit posted to GitHub (and later removed). The flaw lives in the sub_42232C function of the router firmware, where an attacker-controlled macaddr field is copied into a command buffer via snprintf and passed to system() without validation, enabling remote command execution through a crafted POST to /goform/set_prohibiting. Firmware versions 240126 and 24082 are affected. D-Link retired the DIR-823X line in 2025, so there is no vendor patch and no vendor patch coming. The Mirai variant, called 'tuxnokill' by its authors, drops from 88.214.20[.]14 via a simple shell script, supports multiple CPU architectures, uses XOR key 0x30 to obfuscate strings, and phones home to 64.89.161[.]130 on TCP port 44300. The same operator is chaining D-Link alongside CVE-2023-1389 (TP-Link AX21) and a ZTE ZXV10 H108L RCE, giving them a diverse pool of end-of-life consumer routers to enslave. At the time Akamai reported, CVE-2025-29635 was not yet on the CISA KEV catalog. The lesson: public PoCs against dead hardware do not stay dormant forever, and the 'wait for active exploitation' instinct gives attackers a year's head start.

Check
Check your external attack surface (including remote-worker home networks that terminate corporate VPNs) for any D-Link DIR-823X, TP-Link AX21, or ZTE ZXV10 H108L routers facing the internet.
Affected
D-Link DIR-823X firmware 240126 and 24082 (the entire discontinued product line is affected and will not receive a vendor patch). Also actively targeted: TP-Link AX21 routers vulnerable to CVE-2023-1389 and ZTE ZXV10 H108L devices.
Fix
Replace affected D-Link DIR-823X units with a supported model - there is no fix. For TP-Link AX21, apply the vendor firmware addressing CVE-2023-1389. Block outbound traffic to 88.214.20[.]14 and 64.89.161[.]130 at your corporate perimeter and DNS resolver, and hunt for any past connections to them in flow logs. For remote-worker environments, enforce corporate-approved home-router models or at minimum audit for end-of-life consumer hardware terminating VPN tunnels.