Last updated: September 29, 2026 at 8:42 AM UTC
All 891 Vulnerability 357 Breach 144 Threat 383 Defense 7
Tag: account-takeover (13 articles)Clear

Hackers social-engineer Meta's new AI account-recovery bot to hijack high-value Instagram handles; MFA-enabled accounts were unaffected

Krebs on Security reports that attackers social-engineered Meta's newly-deployed conversational AI account-recovery assistant to hijack high-value, short Instagram handles allegedly worth over half a million dollars. Meta had rolled out the AI layer to reduce friction in common recovery workflows - relinking emails, triggering password resets, verifying ownership - that previously required weeks of back-and-forth with automated ticketing. Just as human support staff can be tricked into granting unauthorized access, the AI assistant proved equally eager to help and vulnerable to manipulation. Meta pushed an emergency patch over the weekend and says no back-end database was breached. Critically, the exploit failed against any account with MFA enabled.

Check
For high-value social accounts, enable phishing-resistant MFA (passkey or security key) now. Review whether any platforms you depend on use AI bots for sensitive account-recovery workflows.
Affected
High-value Instagram accounts without MFA. More broadly, any platform deploying AI chatbots for account recovery creates a social-engineerable attack surface, just like human support staff.
Fix
Enable the strongest MFA available - even SMS codes blocked this exploit. Treat AI-driven account-recovery flows as a new attack surface and require step-up verification for high-value account changes.

Google Chrome rolls out Device Bound Session Credentials to all users, binding cookies to TPM/Secure Enclave against theft

Google has made Device Bound Session Credentials (DBSC) generally available in Chrome, rolling it out to all users to blunt session-cookie theft. First announced in 2024 and in beta since April, DBSC cryptographically binds session cookies to a specific device using the hardware security chip - the TPM on Windows or the Secure Enclave on macOS. Because the public/private keys are generated inside the security chip and never leave it, stolen cookies become useless on any other machine, defeating the infostealer-to-account-takeover pipeline that bypasses MFA. Google frames it as a shift from reactive detection to proactive prevention. The protection is most effective where sites adopt the DBSC server-side protocol.

Check
Confirm managed Chrome fleets are updated to the DBSC-capable release. For your own web properties, evaluate adopting the server-side DBSC protocol to bind user sessions to device hardware.
Affected
Organizations relying on session cookies without device binding remain exposed to infostealer-driven account takeover that bypasses MFA. DBSC only protects sessions where both browser and server support it.
Fix
Roll out DBSC-capable Chrome via policy. Implement the DBSC server-side protocol on high-value web apps. Pair with phishing-resistant MFA and short session lifetimes for defense in depth.

Russia behind Signal phishing campaign that compromised Bundestag President Julia Klöckner - 300+ German officials affected

Der Spiegel reported on April 25 that German government sources now blame Russia for a large-scale Signal phishing campaign that compromised the account of Bundestag President Julia Klöckner. At least 300 Signal accounts of German political figures were targeted; investigators say attackers accessed chat histories, files, and phone numbers. Chancellor Friedrich Merz was in the same CDU group chat as Klöckner but his device showed no signs of compromise. The attack used pure social engineering - operators posed as Signal support and asked victims to share verification codes or PINs.

Check
Brief executives, board members, and political-staff who use Signal that anyone messaging them claiming to be 'Signal support' is hostile - Signal never asks for codes by message.
Affected
Signal users in any role attractive to a state intelligence service: politicians, military, diplomats, defense contractors, investigative journalists, NGOs working on Russia or Ukraine, and the executives and assistants of all of the above. The attack works by tricking users into sharing codes - it does not exploit a Signal flaw.
Fix
Train high-risk staff that Signal will never ask for verification codes via message. Enable Signal's Registration Lock PIN. Periodically check Linked Devices and remove anything unfamiliar. Add detection for Signal phishing pages on perimeter URL filters and add Signal account-takeover scenarios to your tabletop catalogue.