Last updated: August 19, 2026 at 1:47 AM UTC
All 741 Vulnerability 286 Breach 129 Threat 319 Defense 7
Tag: ai-assistant (2 articles)Clear

Researchers trick Microsoft Copilot into revealing its own data-exfiltration bypass

Varonis disclosed a flaw in Microsoft Copilot Personal, the consumer assistant, that could let a single click exfiltrate data from connected apps, and the way they found it is striking. Tracked as CVE-2026-24301 and named CoSnitch, the technique had the researchers repeatedly ask Copilot why a prompt could not run without user interaction; each refusal added a technical justification, until the assistant named a hidden parameter, the exact session conditions where it worked, and the protections meant to block it. Building the request as described, the bypass ran. Varonis said Copilot was not breached but played. Related research showed attacker pages persisting unwanted memory in Copilot through indirect prompt injection.

Check
Treat AI assistants with access to connected apps and persistent memory as a data-exfiltration and manipulation surface, and review what apps and data your assistants can reach on a single user action.
Affected
Users of AI assistants like Microsoft Copilot Personal connected to email and other apps; a crafted link can drive the assistant to leak connected-app data or persist attacker instructions in its memory.
Fix
Limit which apps and data assistants can access, apply vendor updates, be cautious with links that invoke an assistant, and watch for unexpected actions, since a refusal does not close a bypass.

Atlassian Rovo assistant can be tricked into leaking Jira and Confluence data

Two security firms showed that Atlassian's Rovo AI assistant can be steered by hidden instructions into collecting Jira and Confluence data a signed-in user can access and sending it to an outside server. PromptArmor concealed the instructions in a document Rovo reads, so asking it to organize tickets makes it gather internal data and leak it through a URL request, with no approval step and even with web search disabled. Varonis used a chat URL parameter to preload instructions, so one click ran them with the user's privileges. Atlassian fixed the link-based path server-side, but the content-based path was not confirmed fixed at disclosure.

Check
Scope which users, groups, and apps can use Rovo and which data it can reach, and treat documents and pages it processes as capable of carrying hidden instructions.
Affected
Organizations using Atlassian Rovo across Jira and Confluence; hidden instructions in content the assistant reads can make it exfiltrate tickets, pages, and connected data under a legitimate user's access.
Fix
Limit Rovo's access and the connectors it can reach, restrict who can enable it, monitor for unusual outbound requests from the assistant, and treat all content it ingests as untrusted input.