Confused deputy weaknesses still expose cross-tenant access in major clouds

Researchers showed that confused deputy weaknesses persist in Google Cloud and Microsoft Azure, where a trusted service can be tricked into acting on an attacker's behalf against resources it should not reach. The pattern shows up when one service holds broad permissions and accepts instructions or identifiers from a less-trusted source without verifying who is really asking, which can enable cross-tenant access or privilege escalation. It is the same class of issue behind recent findings in enterprise agent and integration tooling, where a component with a user's permissions follows attacker-supplied input. The takeaway is architectural: identity and authorization must be checked at every trust boundary, not assumed from the calling service.

Check

Review cloud integrations and automation where one service acts for another, and confirm each checks the real caller's identity and authorization rather than trusting the upstream service.

Affected

Organizations relying on cloud services and integrations that pass identifiers or instructions between trust boundaries; a broadly permissioned service can be steered into cross-tenant access or privilege escalation.

Fix

Scope service permissions tightly, validate the originating identity at every boundary, use per-tenant isolation and unique unguessable identifiers, and monitor for a trusted service accessing resources outside its expected scope.